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This paper examines the transformations that took place in the discourse of Iraq’s 
non-Muslim minorities after the U.S. led invasion in 2003. By looking at the first three 
years of the invasion, this research captures the emergence of sectarian identities among 
Iraq’s Mandaeans and Christians. Relying on never-before examined evidence, this paper 
argues that the invasion caused these minorities to adopt clear sectarian tendencies as a 
reaction to a political environment that was becoming less secular every day. While all 
members of these two groups did not share similar political views, most of them started 
expressing themselves politically based on sectarian grounds.   
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This thesis looks at the transformations that took place in the discourse of Iraqi ethnic and 
religious minorities around the time of the U.S. led invasion in 2003. While the terms Mandaean 
and Christian (Chaldean and Assyrian) can be thought of as religious signifiers, they are 
simultaneously ethnic signifiers, because in Iraq, like most other places in the world, ethnicity 
and religion are inseparable. The core of this project will examine how the two minorities, the 
Mandaeans1 and the Christians, perceived the new reality of the invasion, their place in the larger 
Iraqi political sphere and their relationships in relation to each other as well as to the larger 
ethnic and religious groups, namely the Shi’is, Sunnis, and Kurds. Dealing with fundamental 
questions such as are they religions or ethnicities? What is their place in the new Iraq? This 
thesis explores how minorities both inside and outside Iraq used the newly granted freedom of 
expression as well as the internet to construct what Fanar Haddad calls sectarian identities.  
Relying on never before accessed digital archival material among other sources, this research 
                                                          
1 The Mandaeans, or Sabians Mandaeans, also known as al-Sabia’a al-Manda’iyeen in Arabic, or simply just as al-
Sabi’a, is a gnostic religion which considers the southern parts of Iraq, especially the marshes in Misan Province, 
and the southwestern parts of Iran in the Ahvaz Province to be their homeland. They have spread over the years to 
many cities in Iraq and Iran. (Shirazi, An Encyclopedia of the Islamic Republic 2008). Considered by many to be 
one of the smallest and most endangered ethnoreligious groups, the Mandaeans number no more than 100,000 
individuals worldwide according to the most optimistic estimates. (Shirazi 2008) While the origin of Mandaeanism 
remains unknown, scholars have speculated about the Zoroastrian origin of the religion. Recent scholarship, 
however, suggests Mandaeanism to have evolved from an older, extinct religion known as the Kentaean religion 
sometime in the late antiquity (Häberl 2013). Today’s Mandaeans adhere to the teachings of John the Baptist, a fact 
that won them the misnomer Christians of St. Johan even though they are not in fact Christians. The Mandaean main 
holy book, the Ginza Rba, or the Big Treasure, seems to have borrowed from Kentaean and Zoroastrian sources as 
well as other later sources, which makes it very different from the bible (Bladel 2007 ). A small number of the 
Mandaeans in Iran still speak Mandaic, a dialect of eastern Aramaic, most Mandaeans in Iraq and Iran speak Arabic 
or Farsi. For more information, see Faegheh Shirazi’s entry on the Mandaens in the An Encyclopedia of the Islamic 
Republic, 2008, pp. 329-33.  
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explores the status of these two minorities in a post-war Iraq which was marked by sectarian 
tensions. .2      
The single party policy the Ba’ath party applied since the 1960s along with the ruthless 
persecution of members of Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) deprived non-Muslim minorities in Iraq 
of all the traditional venues through which they expressed their political leanings. Further 
restructuring within the pan-Arabist Ba’ath party accompanied Saddam Hussein became 
president of Iraq. The continuous reliance of the Ba’ath leadership on tribesmen from Tikrit, 
Saddam Hussein’s hometown, further alienated and marginalized non-Titkriti Iraqis. The short 
period of tolerance towards the ICP effectively ended the year Saddam Hussein came to power 
as the ICP “formally broke with the regime, most of its senior leadership fled the country” (Tripp 
2007, p.210). The Iraq-Iran war in 1980 followed by the Second Gulf War in 1991 saw 
Hussein’s grip on power increase exponentially. Uprisings in the Kurdish controlled areas in the 
north and Shi’i dominant cities of the south prompted Saddam Hussein to use extreme force to 
suppress them.  
The almost complete censorship of publications and media left the voices of minorities 
either suppressed or, at best, echoing state propaganda. The instigation of the “faith campaign” in 
1994, a move seen by many as Saddam’s attempt to highjack the rising religious tide in order to 
increase government control, was, as the historian Charles Tripp argues, another blow to the 
Ba’ath ‘s claim to secularism.3 The move alienated non-Muslim minorities even further. For the 
smaller groups such as the Mandaeans, it blurred the distinction especially between Sunni Islam 
                                                          
2 Occasionally, this study uses the Turkmen as well as other minorities to make certain points of comparison or 
contrast. Lack of comparable, accessible sources in either Arabic or English forced limitations on including the 
Turkmen in this study as a third case study.  
3 For a detailed overview of Iraq’s modern history and Saddam Hussein’s rule, see Charles Tripp’s masterful study, 
A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2007 
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and the ruling party. Secular Middle Eastern governments, as Saba Mahmoud argues, 
consistently strengthen the sense of sectarian identity among minority, as well as majority, 
populations whenever they tried to “regulate religion” or interreligious interactions. (Mahmoud 
2016, p.15) In this sense, pre-invasion Iraq does not deviate much from the norm which 
Mahmoud identifies. Although it could be argued that the external forces in the form of wars, 
economic sanctions, etc. further worsened the internal situation in Iraq. The gradual collapse of 
the socio-political space around minorities deepened their isolation within the country. Rather 
than remedying their predicament, the U.S. led invasion complicated matters further by 
consolidating power in the hands of the three largest groups, in particular the Shi’is. The 
minorities were left wondering what their position was in the new Iraq. 
 Minorities in Kurdistan did not always fair better. The 1990s saw the Kurds establish 
autonomy and fight for power. The struggle between warring Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barazani 
and Jalal Talabani, was only concluded in 1996 when the former asked for Saddam Hussein’s 
help to drive the latter out of Soleimaniya, effectively putting Barazani in control of the fate of 
all of Kurdistan and parts of Kirkuk. The Kurdish policies of Kurdifying Turkmeni and Christian 
areas, a policy which continued and even intensified after the 2003 invasion, in addition to 
deteriorating security and economic stagnation, were all factors that drove wedge of sectarian 
division deeper between minorities and the dominant groups. (Tripp 2007).  
 
 The fact that Kurdistan allowed the Christians, Turkmenis, and Yezidis (also known as 
Izadi) to establish their own political parties between the early 1990s and the early 2000s 
indicates the sectarian nature of the political atmosphere in Kurdistan. It is possible that the 
rising sectarian attitudes of Iraq’s minorities, especially the non-Muslims, was a response to what 
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Khalil Osman calls the primordial sectarianism of the Shi’is, Sunnis, and Kurds in Iraq. Osman 
sees sectarianism to have been a permanent characteristic of the state-making process of Iraq. He 
attributes this sectarianism to “the failure to resolve the inherent tensions between ubiquitous 
primordial non-state, including and above all sectarian, ethnic and/or tribal identities… and 
concepts of unified nationhood and a uniform citizenry inherent in building a nation-state... ” 
(Osman 2002, p.2). This research does not go far back enough to argue for a primordial 
sectarianism among minorities, it rather notices an increasing trend of sectarianism and intra-sect 
divisions taking place among non-Muslim minorities during the time of the U.S. led invasion.  
Osman’s notion of sectarianism relies on the history of authoritarianism in the modern 
state in Iraq. In this sense, he goes further back than Tripp who links sectarianism in Iraq with 
Saddam Hussein’s rule. For Osman, the “problems of sectarianism…figure as epiphenomena of 
the crisis of the modern state in Iraq” (Osman 2002, p.30). Osman’s notion of primordial 
sectarianism is important to account for the unresolved historical tensions that could have existed 
as early as the beginning of the twentieth century if not earlier. His definition of sectarianism, 
however, requires further definition. To be sure, he is not the only scholar to leave the term 
undefined or accept its general vagueness. For this reason, Fanar Haddad chooses to do away 
with the term sectarianism altogether, adopting instead the term sectarian identity.    
  Haddad uses the term sectarian identity instead of sectarianism to indicate that “we are 
dealing with perceptions and emotions” of group and individuals rather than a large, well-defined 
network of interactions that extends from the macro level of a society to the micro level of the 
individual. (Haddad 2011, p.3)   By taking this approach, Haddad attempts to present what drives 
sectarian identities in the Iraqi context to be emerge and be adopted by the individuals. In other 
words, what motivates these sectarian identities to be ‘activated’ as he puts it. Looking at Iraq’s 
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Shi’is and Sunnis, Haddad enumerates four possible drivers that activate sectarian identities. 
These are “external influence, economic competition, competing myth-symbol complexes and 
contested cultural ownership of the nation.” (Haddad 2011, p.10). In the case of the Mandaeans 
and the Christians, the last two of these drivers apply more than the first two. This conclusion 
would not have surprised Haddad who also argued that these two drivers were the most 
important sectarian dynamics in post 2003 Iraq since it is through myths and symbols that sects 
memorize their traumatic experiences, glories, and heroic figures. They then give these symbols 
narratives which validate the sect’s claims to ‘their embodiment of the nation” (Haddad 2011, 
p.22).  
Haddad’s Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity develops a complex, theory 
of sectarian identities in the context of Iraq’s largest sects, namely the Shi’is, Sunnis, and Kurds. 
His model for using sectarian identities rather than sectarianism represents a welcome shift in the 
scholarship in the studies that deal with the subject in post-invasion Iraq. Elsewhere, Haddad 
develops the notion further still, calling for replacing the term sectarianism with the adjective 
sectarian to be followed by a noun such as ‘relations,’ ‘unity,’ etc. Doing so, according to 
Haddad, would clarify “some aspects of sectarian identity” better than the all-encompassing term 
sectarianism does. (Haddad 2017). One limitation in Haddad’s work is that it overlooks 
minorities as examples of emerging sectarian identities in Iraq after 2003. This research fills this 
gap, if only partially. It examines the way sectarian identities emanated in the discourse of 
Mandaeans and Christians of Iraq after the invasion.   
The first chapter examines the way Mandaeans and the Christians thought of themselves 
before the invasion and how their conception of who they were and what they were began to 
change following the invasion. Both groups shared multiple similarities in terms of lacking 
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strong leadership. Both groups also lacked internal cohesion. They disagreed many fundamental 
issues. In the case of Christians, the disagreements took on an ethnic turn, solidifying the 
separation of the ethnic groups among Christians and ending any attempt at unifying them. As 
such, the first chapter documents the early rise of the sectarian identities of Mandaeans and 
Muslims.  
The second chapter continues chronologically from the first. It examines some of the 
symbolic drivers that activated the sectarian identities of both Mandaeans and Christians. Both 
groups started seeking and adopting old myths about their origins. Also, members in both groups 
started adopting narratives of victimhood as violence against members of minorities increased in 
2004. The chapter then examines how the two elections of 2005, the Representatives Assembly 
elections in January and the Parliamentary elections in December, saw both groups engage with 
fervor in sectarian politics.  
The originality of this thesis and its importance derive from the primary sources it uses. The 
sources, all online based, consist of some of the largest records of communication known for 
these groups. The first and most comprehensive of these sources is the archive of the Mandaean 
Yahoo Group. An email group exclusive for Mandaeans, the Yahoo group contains no less than 
two hundred thousand emails dating back to the year 2000. While it was mainly a diaspora tool 
of communication, the Mandaean Yahoo grew in size over the years and now hosts Mandaeans 
from all over the world, including Iraq. The Mandaean Yahoo Group archive holds a very rich, 
never before explored record of communication of contemporary Mandaeans. With emails 
dealing on various topics from politics, to social relationships, and existential concerns, the sheer 
volume of the record and the number of its participants gives us an unparalleled inside look into 
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the concerns, views, and politics of living Mandaeans. As a Mandaean, I as well as many 
members in my family have group members access to this Mandaean Yahoo Group.  
The second primary source is the message archive of ankawa.com. An Iraqi Christian 
website, ankawa.com holds a rich archive consisting of more than thirty-six thousand messages 
dating to June 2002. Being open to the public, the Christian website lacks the intimate 
interactions of the Mandaean Yahoo Group. Nonetheless, it hosts a large number of articles, 
messages, and interactions between diaspora Christians and their Iraq based fellowmen. All in 
all, it provides an indispensable resource to understand the Christian perspective of the changes 





Chapter 1: Sectarian Identities Emerging 
 
Around the time of the invasion, the Mandaeans and Christians of Iraq found themselves 
in comparable situations. Despite differences in the size of their populations, the discourse of the 
two minorities shared multiple similarities. This chapter looks at these minorities’ discourse in 
the wake of the invasion and asks how the invasion changed it. It argues that the invasion caused 
these two minorities to fragment further, instead of becoming more united. Analyzing the 
discourse of these minorities reveals that they lacked internal cohesion, inclusive political 
organization, and a strong leadership to keep them from seeking inner divisions. The first part of 
the chapter focusses on the Mandaeans while the second part looks at the Christians.  
 
“Who…[is] going to speak for us?” 
  
 As one of Iraq’s smallest non-Muslim minorities, Iraq’s Mandaeans started large scale 
migrations since the end of the last century due to many of the conditions outlined above. A few 
thousand Mandaeans were already settled in multiple countries around the globe by the turn of 
the century (Nashi 2002) In 2000, the Mandaeans started using the Mandaean Yahoo Group to 
link the Mandaeans living in diaspora. Up until April of 2003, most of the group’s 
communication took place in English. As a result of that, most of the voices encountered early in 
this study belong to individuals who have a high level of education or who have lived in English-
speaking countries for a while, or both. The Mandaean Yahoo Group only permits Mandaeans to 
access it. As such, the electronic group represents a haven for its members to debate on politics, 
religion, and Mandaeans’ internal organization, etc. The electronic group offered many of its 
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members the opportunity to communicate freely for the first time in their lives. Making use of 
their newly found freedoms, the group members attempted to understand what the Mandaeans 
were.  
The Mandaeans debated whether they were a religion, an ethnicity, or a family (a clan-
like social entity). Debates on these matters took place even before the war. In 2002 members of 
the Yahoo Group from New Zealand and the United Kingdom started using the term 
“community” to refer to the Mandaeans. These Mandaeans adopted the term community to 
overcome differences and emphasize unity. New Zealand Mandaean Farhan Yousif, a physician, 
warned of lack of communication between members of “our community.” For as he saw it “[f]or 
every moment of silence we choose to take, we are making the choice to remove the cement that 
binds the bricks of our relationship. Everyday more cement dries up and crumbles. Everyday a 
new brick comes crashing down.” (Yousif 2002).  More than a year earlier, Yousif had written to 
the group urging members of “this loyal community” to stay united to “build a strong community 
and family ties” (Yousif 2001). Corroborating Yousif’s point on the importance of community as 
a conceptual framework to imagine the social organization of the Mandaeans, Eb Al Kheimssi 
asked the Mandaean Yahoo Group co-founder and moderator, who is also the head of the 
Mandaean Associations in America, Dr. Suhaib Nashi, to use the “word "community" more often 
and think of how we can help one another outside the realm of religon,” (Al-Khamisi 2002) 
Nashi, on whom more will be said later, showed hesitation in adopting the term uncritically. He 
requested further clarification “from Eb AlKhamissi about the definition of community.” (Nashi 
2002).  
 The debate on the term community and its applicability to the Mandaean case originated 
in a very tempestuous episode of the Mandaean Yahoo Group series of communication. It came 
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at a time when Mandaeans questioned their very existence in diaspora and their links to Iraq. A 
random insult by an unidentified group member started what came to be known as the “Zigma 
Storm” which left them pondering the meaning of their existence as a religion, what they viewed 
as scared, and what to them meant to be a Mandaean. It also forced them to think of their lack of 
cohesion and internal organization, two facts that persisted well beyond the invasion.      
 The Zigma Storm started with a disdainful insult. A troll named Zigma300 accused the 
entire Mandaean priesthood of failing to rise to the challenges brought upon by the age of 
internet as they neglected equipping the Mandaeans with a strong foundation of religious 
knowledge, focusing instead on limited personal and financial gains. Zigma300 lamented what 
he saw as the lack of central authority and competence within the “community.” According to 
Zigma300, outsiders pretended to be Mandaeans and Mandaean temples, Mandis, proliferated 
without a check. “Importers” he said were “claiming to be Mandaeans, Men starting Mandees all 
over the world.”4 Zigma300 then proceeded with a vulgar attack that shook Mandaeans to their 
core “I Face every living Termetha, Ginzafri and So Self proclaimed Reysh Ema . In the name of 
Hibil Zewa son of the father of all light Minda id Heyya, i spit in the face of each and everyone 
of you for your ignorance.”5 (Zigma300 2002). The irony of using the by then relatively new 
technology to attack the priests at a time when many of them were not yet familiar with it  added 
                                                          
4 Throughout this chapter, I kept the English text in quotation marks as it appeared in the original messages, with all 
their typos and vague expressions. Preserving the original text despite its faults is a matter of academic honesty. It 
also communicates to the reader the difficulties these members faced in using the new technology and a non-native 
language to express their ideas.  
5 A Termitha is a low-ranking priest. This rank is religiously higher than a layman, but it indicates a student priest. 
The word termitha in Mandaic has the same meaning as the Arabic word telmith, literally meaning student. A 
Ganzibra is a higher degree of priesthood. Rish ‘ama is the highest degree of priesthood in the Mandaean religion. 
Minda id Heyya refers to the spirit of life, or God in Mandaean theorlogy. I left the typos as they appear in the 
original. For a detailed study of the hierarchy of the Mandaean priesthood, and the Mandaean religion and culture in 
general, refer to E. S. Drower’s classic work The Mandaeans of Iraq and Iran:  Their Cults, Customs, Magic, 
Legends, and Folklore. Oxford: Clendon Press, 1937.  
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to the potency of Zigma300’s barrage. It proved the point that the Mandaean priesthood of Iraq 
did really need to rise up to modern challenges.  
Zigma300’s charge continued as he listed more serious accusations against the priests. He 
then asked Mandaeans to take a very radical step, to boycott the priests: 
You6 are but mere merchants of spirituality. You claim  
knowledge of Heyya and all you know is how much you are going to make  
of our community. If you don't do something about this and i am  
taking to each sheikh or so called sheikh. If you don't start  
teaching the rites, rituals and Gnosis of the mandaeans to your Sons  
& Daughters. You will wind up as ignorant dogs of the faith.I face  
each true Mandaean to wage war on ignorance for the sake of our  
children. Their greed has led to the dissolve of our religion. I ask  
each true mandaean to read our religious texts ask the learned people  
to answer their questions to fight back to hold the so called  
Termithas and ban them from our society until they repent. Close the  
doors in the face of ignorance and greed. Never let it in, (Zigma300 2002) 
The frustration with Mandaeans’ lack of central unifying authority, lack of consensus on 
priorities, lack of knowledge of the faith, fear for the fate of the religion and the lack of 
initiatives to save it are very visible themes in Zigma300’s message. He directed all this anger 
towards the priests. In doing so, he tested the Mandaeans’ consensus on what they held more 
sacred: their faith and religion or the men who performed the duties of their religion. The stormy 
debate that ensued form this challenge would change how Mandaeans viewed themselves and 
would force them to think of their organization, or lack thereof.  
 Zigma300’s verbal onslaught generated a wide range of reactions that ranged from his 
instant ban by the group moderator, to anger in the form of threats of suing for defamation, to 
more sympathetic responses and calls for unity. Eb al-Khamisi was one of the first to offer an 
opinion on Zigma300’s message. His long response started by formally renouncing Zigma300’s 
                                                          
6 Referring to the priests 
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approach, yet he took his message to heart by asking “What do we maintain from this 
mandaean(ism)? and what do we need from our priests to do?” Attempting to resolve the 
dichotomies between faith and tradition, or religion and the practice of religion, he concluded 
that “Mandaean(ism) is no longer a religion… thus it's a community.” (E. al-Khamisi 2002). For 
al-Khamisi, a community was the only conceptual category that could encompass individuals 
who ranged from those that did not believe in metaphysics to those who did so very much.    
 Al-Khamisi’s response was echoed by other members. S. J. Farhan, a medical doctor 
living in the United Kingdom, wrote of having a “sense of belonging” despite not being 
religious. “[W]e have a very instentical [intrinsic?], distinguished, solid and a very well 
identified sense of belonging,socsialy, humanley, psychologicaly, culturaley,and emotionally 
MANDAEAN.” (S. J. Farhan 2002). Despite the typos and somewhat vague expressions, 
Farhan’s point about feeling a sense of belonging that is divorced from religious beliefs or 
spirituality comes across clearly. The religious alienation he identified was a common feature 
among many of the Mandaeans who lived in the diaspora before the invasion. This alienation, 
incidentally, was not too different from the alienation that Zigma300 raged against. It was an 
alienation that originated from a lack of religious knowledge and, more importantly, a lack of 
spiritual guidance.  
 Another noteworthy reply to Zigma300 came as a surprise to everyone. A young 
educated priest named Alaa Nashmi wrote to the group reminding them that Zigma300 had 
entitled his message “(word of truth) and,” he added, “i want to listen to him.” (Nashmi 2002). 
Nashmi’s unexpected call for greater understanding won the group’s admiration and was 
received very positively as many members commended his initiative. Some saw in this new 
open-minded mentality as the only hope for Mandaeans: “with this wisdom” al-Khamisi 
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predicted “we can only win our future.” (E. al-Khamisi 2002). Others, like Princessq8, went even 
further, inviting Zigma300 to rejoin the conversation and freely express all his thoughts, but on 
condition that he “he agrees to make his argument without insulting anybody.” (Princessq8 
2002). 
Princessq8 was one of the very few feminine voices in the group at that time. Hers’ 
represents a true minority voice within a minority voice. Her positions compared to the others in 
a group dominated by middle-aged to old, professional, university educated men, usually came 
across as radically democratic. She consciously hides her identity in the group because of fear 
that group members might not take her words seriously if they knew who she was. “i am a strong 
beliver,” she said, “that, unfortunatly, SOME members would communicate differently to others 
once they identify their gender or their background.” (Princessq8 2002). She was also the first to 
lament identifying and publicly shaming Zigma300: “Personally, i regret the fact that his identity 
was revelead without his premision. it doesnt matter who he is or what he is, what matters is that 
he has an openion that needs to be looked over.” (Princessq8 2002). 
For the Mandaeans in the Yahoo Group, the Zigma Storm was an important exercise in 
democracy in the age of the internet. The potency of the insult brought voices never before heard 
in the group and generated a genuine debate. Although Zigma300 was identified and actually 
wrote to the Group Moderator apologizing, everyone agreed that he had touched a vital nerve for 
Mandaeans. Were Mandaeans a religion, a community, or something else? What role did priests 
play within Mandaeanism? And what did democracy represent for Mandaeans at a time when 
their world was set to change as the horns of war started blowing? 
Al-Khamisi, who was an active member of the group and showed enthusiastic 
engagement in the debate on the Zigma Storm, linked the debate to the discussion on democracy 
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that was taking place before the invasion. He did not understand democracy in the sense of 
voting for political parties and winning governments by a majority voting. Democracy for him 
took on a very different meaning. In a talk that he had prior to the war with Imam Hassan al-
Qazwini, an influential Shi’i scholar who has headed a number of important Islamic schools and 
institutes in the USA and elsewhere, al-Khamisi recounts telling him “I am a Sabian Mandaean, 
and the way I understand democracy… is about the protection of my rights and your rights too as 
individuals first.” (E. al-Khamisi 2002)7 It is out of this conviction in democracy’s role in 
guaranteeing individual rights that he turned to the group members urging them to show more 
tolerance in dealing with cases such as Zigma300’s. He argued that the importance of democracy 
was not in rhetoric, but “more importantly is to practice it.”   
Responding to al-Khamisi, a young member from New Zealand, Furat al-Saleem, 
elaborated a curious position on democracy, alas one that expressed clear Islamophobia. For him 
“[i]f the state is not secular and democratic in the same time, then it's not a free state.” He 
explained his position claiming that an Islamic government was not capable of true democracy or 
a true representation of minorities. By holding on to a secular state that guaranteed minorities 
rights through what he believed to be three things, a constitution, a democracy and what he 
called the “separation of powers,” one can guarantee that Islamic forces will not swallow up the 
rights and liberties of minorities. This was vital for him because “Islam and freedom” he 
wholeheartedly believed, were “two opposing forces and,” he continued, “that's why the whole 
Islamic world is not and will not be free for as long as I shall live!” (Al-Saleem 2002).   
                                                          
7 For more on Imam Hassan al-Qazwini, visit his official website. www.qazwini.org.  
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Suhaib Nashi, who is the group moderator and an accomplished pediatrician in 
Morristown, New Jersey, weighed in again on the debate, or by now multiple debates, that were 
generated by the Zigma Storm. He started out by agreeing with al-Khamisi and Zigma300 on the 
threats facing Mandaeans and the need for serious action. “Extinction in the next 100 years,” he 
warned with a markedly scientific tone, “is not unthinkable.”  Yet he recognized the importance 
of unity and collective efforts to educate the youth and preserve “the religion,” but without 
priests these attempts would be futile. Suhaib, however went a step further in identifying a major 
problem that Mandaeans had not yet overcame. Their lack of spiritual leaders. “[W]e do have a 
major problem here. Some of our Priests are not true spiritual leaders. Some are not truly 
educated in Mandaean theology and most will disagree on simple matters.” (Nashi 2002). While 
Mandaeans have a formal elected religious leader, Raes al-Taefa, in Iraq, Sheik Sattar al-Hilou, 
he lacked, and still lacks one might argue, overwhelming support among Mandaeans for a 
number of reasons. As a matter of fact, he only attained the rank of Ganzibra, the second highest 
rank, in 2002.8 (Nashmi 2002). The Mandaeans lack of strong, unifying leadership clearly marks 
their weak, unsure position inside and outside Iraq at the time of the invasion. 
Nashi suggested electing a Mandaean Spiritual Council whose job it would be to take on 
the leadership of the Mandaeans, at least in religious matters. The Mandaean leadership he called 
for should “actually help to lead any change in the religion to adjust to the new circumstances.” 
(Nashi 2002). By adapting to changing circumstances Mandaeans, according to him, had a better 
chance of survival. Such a council, Nashi confided, was already being worked on, but it needed 
more efforts to be established. Nashi’s call for generated some excitement in its own merit. A 
poll was started within the group asking members whether they thought the council would be 
                                                          
8 See footnote 5 on page 10 for details on the hierarchy of the Mandaean priesthood.  
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useful. Only 7 members out of more than a hundred or so at the time participated in the poll. All 
of them answered yes. (Mandaean@yahoogroups.com 2002). 
 While some members evidently agreed with Nashi’s suggestion, others thought 
Mandaeans needed to take part in the opposition outside Iraq. In al-Khamisi’s opinion, Nashi’s 
call for adaptation to changing circumstances “is half if not less than [half] a solution” because it 
could only work for Mandaeans in diaspora. Because Mandaeans were too spread out, he thought 
managing them would be very difficult. (Al-Khamisi 2002). It was in this same message that al-
Khamisi urged Nashi to use the term “community” as mentioned above. Al-Khamisi’s frustration 
with the Mandaeans’ powerlessness when acting alone outside Iraq forced him to adopt al-
Saleem’s view. He declared that “Our only "serious" hope is to survive in a Democratic, 
Constitutional, Secular Iraq anything else would be an attempt to buy time and ladies & 
gentlemen TIME IS RUNNING OUT.” (Al-Khamisi 2002). 
 Nashi was skeptical about the value of al-Khamisi’s call for Mandaeans’ participation in 
Iraqi politics. In a long message on the matter, he asked whether it would be effective to 
participate in the political dialogue that was taking place among opposition forces outside Iraq. 
He saw a challenge in that because Mandaeans, he said, did not have a “Mandaean Liberal 
Party…like the Asirians, [Assyrians] The Turkman, Yazidies or the Kurds.” Participating on a 
non-sectarian, individual basis in larger political forces, according to him, was not advisable 
either because “Who…[is] going to speak for us?” For Nashi, representing Mandaeans in Iraq 
from the outside also posed an ethical dilemma. On the one hand, doing so would put the lives of 
Mandaeans in Iraq face to face with the wrath of Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, diaspora 
Mandaeans lacked the right to speak for Mandaeans inside Iraq. “Do we have the right me and 
you,” he asked al-Khamisi, “sitting behind our computers in the West and endangering any sole 
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[soul] inside Iraq?” (Nashi 2002). Closer to the date of the invasion, however, divisions within 
the body of diaspora Mandaeans would surface to an extent not seen before.  
 The Zigma Storm, with all the debates and unprecedented number of responses it 
generated, shows that Mandaeans lacked several important features.9 First of all, they lacked a 
general consensus on whether they were a religion or a community of believers and non-
believers who shared a sense of belonging through blood, and culture, etc. Secondly, they lacked 
a clear leadership that unified them. Neither the Mandaeans’ religious authority nor their elected 
community members had the kind of over whelming support that could enable a strong, popular 
leadership to emerge. More importantly, diaspora Mandaeans, or at least some of them, realized 
through this episode that they lacked the organizational capability and legitimacy to represent 
and speak for all Mandaeans. Apart from harboring the hope for a secular, democratic Iraq to 
save the religion, Mandaeans saw little value in taking political action against Saddam’s rule on 
sectarian grounds. With that realization, they treaded the political scene carefully. But they 
debated whether to join the opposition under the banner of their religion or keep a low profile 
while the events played out, divisions started to surface.  
 Near the end of December 2002, a formally written message from the Sabian Mandaean 
World Council, signed by Dr. I.M. Jawdat, announced to the group that the Council managed to 
meet with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the US Committee for 
Refugees, Refugee Council USA, Denyse Sabagh, former President American Immigration 
Lawyers Association in addition to a number of senators and aid organizations. The Council’s 
meetings were to “to discuss the increasingly severe plight of Sabian Mandaeans and what may 
                                                          
9 August’s archive contains 113 messages, almost double the average monthly emails for that year which is 60.5 
emails per month.   
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be done for Mandaeans to prepare for the ramifications of a potential Iraqi invasion.”  With the 
aim of documenting the abuses that Mandaeans faced, the Council urged the Mandaeans to send 
Dr. I.M. Jawdat all cases of human rights violations that Mandaeans anywhere had experienced 
in order to document them and use them to help Mandaean refugees around the world. The 
Message also set a deadline of three weeks during which these documents were to be collected. 
(Jawdat 2002). 
 “Dear Dr IM Jawdat,” read the first reply immediately following the Council’s message, 
“Please tell us who are you ,and what the World Sabain Mandaean Council is ??” It then 
continued, adding that “we have no idea about it. We need more informations and thank you 
.sincerely yours Araby Farhan AlKamisi  N.Z.” (A. F. al-Khamisi 2002). Araby Farhan al-
Khamisi is a well-known Mandaean lawyer who wrote prolifically on multiple online Iraqi 
newspapers and websites. One of the most senior and active members in the group, he had been 
involved with Iraq’s Mandaeans’ legal representation in pre-invasion Iraq for many decades and 
was living in New Zealand at that time.  A. F. al-Khamisi’s message underscored the lack of 
knowledge and trust the group members had about the Council and its organizer.  
 Predictably, some members of the group suspected the Council of being linked to the 
CIA and of not representing the Mandaeans democratically. Others asked to give the Council a 
chance as it “may be just another society that try to help the Mandaeans worldwide.” (A. N. 
Bahoor 2003). Defending himself and his new organization, Jawdat replied quickly identifying 
himself and how the Council was formed. Yet that attempt failed to stop the mounting 
suspicions. Jawdat claimed that the Council was formed “recently from mandaeans in different 
countries trying to act now to help the [M]andaeans [world-wide] and specially those in need in 
Jordan, Yemen and Indonesia.” (Jawdat 2002). Jawdat’s attempt to clear the suspicions was 
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muddied when members affiliated with the Council accused all those that opposed it of being 
communists. Instead of waiting for the fire to be contained, Jawdat cast more oil on it when he 
hastily announced the creation of the British Mandaean Council. A number of unelected 
Mandaean individuals were appointed to run the new UK based branch of the Council. The 
unexplained sense of urgency in Jawdat’s actions raised more doubts about the true intentions of 
his organization.  
 For Nashi as well as for other members in the group, the problem with the Council was 
that it was formed and was acting outside of the umbrella of the Mandaean Associations Union.10  
The Union in 2002 was far from homogenous. According to Nashi, it consisted of no less than 
thirteen organizations in eight countries in addition to “One or two Mandaean Human Rights 
Organizations” and an organizing committee between the European and the American Mandaean 
Societies. Australia had two organizations for a population of 2000 which contained three 
priests. The USA also had the same amount of organizations for half the population and only one 
priest. Sweden on the other hand had three organizations for a population of roughly 3000 
Mandaeans which like Australia, contained three priests. (Nashi 2002). Given this large number 
of organizations for a relatively small, but very scattered population, the creation of more 
organizations whose members were unelected, at a time that preceded the war was bound to raise 
suspicions about the Council’s agenda.  
Although the tension between the Union and the Council subsided eventually when 
Jawdat called Nashi and agreed to work with the Union, this episode illustrates the divisions and 
lack of clear hierarchy within the organizational structure of the Mandaeans. The agreement 
                                                          
10 The Arabic title adds the phrase “in diaspora” to the name of union. See mandaeanunion.org.  
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between the Union and the Council did not affect matters on the ground much, but it brought an 
official closure to what could have been a serious schism within the organizational body of the 
Mandaeans. Furthermore, even though the Nashi, on behalf of the Union, had made a historic 
decision not to contact or join the Iraqi opposition a few days before the agreement with the 
Council, the Council did not rebel on that decision or at least did not seek to undermine it.     
The Mandaeans debated whether to participate in the Iraqi Opposition Conference in 
London which was organized by the George W. Bush’s administration to take place on 
December 10th, 2002 to “legitimize the goal of regime change.” (Phillips 2005).11 The opposition 
conference was attended by Shi’is, Sunnis, Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkmen. The Mandaeans 
were not invited, so they debated whether they should contact members of the opposition to try 
to secure a spot in the conference. Nashi, speaking on behalf of the Mandaean Associations 
Union, made a clear, firm stance that Mandaeans would not contact Iraqi opposition forces that 
were participating in the conference in London. For Nashi, Mandaeans would not join the Iraqi 
opposition on pure sectarian grounds. “What is happing now in the "opposition meeting"” he 
said, “is a fight for chairs we have no place in it.” (Nashi 2002). Nashi’s position was further 
backed by al-Khamisi who saw no advantage in joining the opposition as a sect. As he put it, 
“what are we gonna say that is so different from the other minorities?” (E. al-Khamisi 2002). 
This evidence, made public here for the first time, is not to be taken lightly. It is nothing short of 
                                                          
11 David L. Phillips’s book, Losing Iraq, provides an insider’s account on the haphazard nature of the London 
Opposition Conference. The Conference was originally set to take place in Brussels. The Belgian government 
however changed its mind closer to the date because staging the conference would conflict with its official policy 
towards the Iraqi government. The date on which the conference was to take place changed multiple times and so 
did the list of initial participants invited to attend. All that planning meant little however as hundreds showed up 
uninvited when the Conference began asking to attend and claiming to represent Iraqis. Phillips, who was a senior 
advisor to US Department of State and who was involved with the planning of the Conference since it was first 
conceived, concluded that the Conference “revealed the difficulties of achieving consensus among Iraqis” as they 
“disagreed sharply on the size and allocation of seats on the coordinating committee.”  
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a historical proof that, prior to the war, the official Mandaean position was markedly anti-
sectarian.  This position was made in spite of lacking internal cohesion, leadership, and political 
organization.  
  
“We are a people through our nationality” 
 
Christians in Iraq showed far more organization and political activity than Mandaeans in 
the months preceding and following the invasion. Sharing a religion with the West meant that 
they received special attention from Rome as well as from the United States, a privilege not 
available for other religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq. Another advantage they enjoyed was 
that many Christian communities had lived in the northern regions of the country since ancient 
times. In modern Iraq, that meant living in Kurdish controlled areas. Kurdistan allowed Christian 
parties to participate in local and parliamentary elections and in 1992 gave them the freedom to 
learn Syriac, their native language in schools. (Hussein 2003). After the invasion, the Christian 
parties connected with their people in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities and became active in the 
post-war political scene. 
In Western academia, the Christians of Iraq fall into three ecclesiastical designations: The 
Nestorians (Assyrians), the Chaldeans, and the Jacobites. The name Syriac-speaking Christians is 
sometimes falsely applied to them. (Donabed 2012). Having lived in either Kurdish speaking or 
Arabic speaking regions, and having experienced the national education system, it was only 
natural  that the Christians began to identify more and more with the Iraqi national identity and 
some of them either spoke Kurdish or Arabic as their primary language.  
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In that nationalistic atmosphere, some Christians felt threatened that they were forgetting 
their mother tongue, the Assyrian language, especially in the Ba’ath controlled regions. They 
blamed the “Chauvinistic Iraqi regime” for starting a “policy of identity liquidation” in 1972 to 
Arabize them. (Hussein 2003).  This policy peaked in the 1977 when the Iraqi government 
carried out a national census that did not mention the Assyrian ethnicity, forcing Christians and 
other minorities to identify themselves as either Arabs or Kurds. Reacting to what they saw as a 
hostile situation, a group of militant Christians formed the Assyrian Democratic Movement or 
ZOWAA, which is short for movement in Syriac. Their objective was to “to satisfy the political 
objectives of the Assyrian people in Iraq, in response to the oppressive brutality of the regime in 
Baghdad, and its attempts to liquidate our national existence in our ancestral homeland of Bet-
Nahren.” (Assyrian Democratic Movement n.d.). Three of ZOWAA’s leadership were executed 
by Saddam Hussein’s regime between 1984-5. By 1989 the ZOWAA had moved to Kurdistan 
and continued its armed struggle there against the Iraqi government.  
As of 2003, ZOWAA was actively participating in the Kurdistan’s parliamentary system, 
had a number of publications in Syriac, as well as a Union for Assyrians, branches in multiple 
Western countries, and an active Chaldean, and Syrian Women (Ishu 2002). ZOWAA, however 
was not the only political Christian party. One example is rather obscure the Assyrian National 
Party which has an active news site in Arabic. This party was active during the invasion, but not 
much information is available on it apart from scant news pieces announcing meetings it held 
with ZOWAA recently. This fact indicates that the two parties could be working together but are 
still not united.12  
                                                          
12 The party’s current website, www.atranaya.net has taken over its old site www.atranaya.org which was active 
during the war in 2003. For news on the recent meeting between ZOWAA and the Assyrian National Party in the 
Northern Iraqi city of Dahuk, see http://www.zowaa.org/ االشور-الوطني-الحزب-يزور-الحركة-من-وفد /#.W_5eBPZFzmI 
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Apart from the ZOWAA and Assyrian National parties, both of which are Assyrian, there 
is at least one Chaldean party. In 2000, the Chaldean Democratic Union (CDU) Party was 
formed in Kurdistan after a series of attempts that last close to eight years. According to its 
official website, the party’s formation came in at a vital time to fill in a gap in Chaldean political 
representation, to voice the demands of the Chaldeans, and to end the Chaldean’s 
marginalization. During the time of the CDU’s formation, the Assyrian parties, according to the 
same source, “were working on promoting the notion that all Christians [in Iraq] were Assyrian.” 
(Tomi, 'The Foundation of the Chaldean Democratic Union Party was a Historical Necessity' 
2008) It is worth noting here that the Syrians (Jacobites), Suriyanyeen in Arabic, do not seem to 
have their own political party and have no distinct voice like the Chaldeans or the Assyrians. The 
same is true for the Armenians who are overlooked by the discourse of all the other Iraqi 
Christians despite having a population of about 20000 if not more in 2003 and a presence in Iraq 
and the region since at least the 16th or 17th centuries. (Logan 2010).  
The political tension between the Chaldeans and the Assyrians will be examined 
thoroughly in a later section. As for now, it suffices to say that up to the time of the invasion, 
both the Assyrians and the Chaldeans were using a unifying discourse. One example of that was 
the 46th issue of the Chaldo-Ashur Supplement to the Communist Party of Kurdistan’s 
newspaper Regay Kurdistan.13 The Supplement’s Op-ed piece was entitled “We are one people.” 
(Oghanna 2001). The all-encompassing tag ‘one people’ or ‘one society’, Sha’ab wahid, in 
Arabic, seemed omnipresent in all official Christian discourse at the time. From articles to 
opinion pieces, they all referred to Christians as one people, or a sha’ab.  
                                                          




Another example of unifying discourse is the website ankawa.com used in this research. 
The website ambitiously claims to be the meeting point of “the sons of our Chaldean, Assyrian, 
and Syrian people, and all sons of Iraq, and all our friends from around the world.”14 (About Site 
2014) The very name of the site, Ankawa, is not arbitrary either. Located on the outskirts of Erbil 
province in the north-eastern part of Iraq, Ankawa has been described as a “Microcosm of 
Christianity” in the Kurdistan Regional Government, KRG. Enjoying relatively more safety and 
a better standard of services than the rest of Erbil, Ankawa has attracted offices of aid agencies, 
oil companies, and consulates of a number of Western countries, including that of the US. 
(Logan 2010). The choice of the name Ankawa for the website therefore invokes a sense of unity 
and harmony among Christians.  
Whereas the Mandaean Yahoo Group functioned more like a closed group where 
members felt free to communicate and debate endlessly on all sorts of topics, ankawa.com, by 
contrast, is a public platform open for all. It is, therefore, more conservative in terms of the 
content it hosts. Furthermore, the site is dominated by representatives of the political Christian 
parties who intend on communicating official party positions. Exceptions to this rule do exist, 
however these are scattered and hard to find. Their existence nonetheless hints at the possibility 
of larger debates taking place among the Christians which were kept away from the public. One 
such debate revolves around the intentions of using the name people, sha’ab to refer to the 
Chaldean-Assyrian-Syrian Christians of Iraq.  
In a comment on a deleted topic on ankawa.com entitled “Kurdistan, God’s Confused 
People,’ a member of the site named Ishak Yako asks the writer to delete the topic not because it 
                                                          
14 “A meeting place for our Chaldean, Assyrian, and Syriac people as well as all Iraqis and all our friends from 
around the world.” 
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could potentially upset the Kurds, but because such topics “do not serve the Christian People.” 
Commenting on Yako’s message, another member called Kamil Issa Kunda, asked Yako to 
define what he meant by Cristian people. “The French, Italians, and English are all Christian 
people” he said before adding, “or did you mean to say our people the Chaldo-Assyrians?” 
Kunda went on to explain the nuance he was pointing at. Christianity for him was a religion, but 
the Chadlo-Assyrians are a people by right of their ethnic nationality, a qawmia. He asserted that 
“[w]e are a people through our nationality.” Yet for Kundo, there was no problem in “opening up 
towards the others who share our land and country as they are our brothers and fellow 
countrymen.” Yako then replied saying he meant the Chaldo-Assyrian people when he said 
sha’ab. As for opening up to fellow countrymen, Yako’s believed they should first “accomplish 
what they [Christians] want then we can defend others…” (Kunda 2003).  
The exchange above, short and formal as it might be, affords us a rare look at an internal 
Christian-Christian debate in which the meaning of the word ‘people’ was negotiated. Which 
Christians does this term include? Which ones does it leave out and why? The term ‘people’ as 
used above could be stretched to include Assyrians and Chaldeans, the two biggest designations 
of Iraqi Christians, but did it also include the Syrians (Jacobite)?15 One thing is clear however, it 
certainly did not include Iraq’s Armenians. Leaving out certain Christian groups highlights the 
ethnic nature of this categorization. ‘People’ hence referred to an ethnicity, or more than one, 
that was also Christian in faith. As will be seen soon, conflicting political parties would 
                                                          
15 The Jacobite meant here refers to members of the Monophysite Eastern churches, in particular the Syriac 
Christians, known in Arabic as ‘Suryan.’ These are not to be confused with the Jacobite of England. The Merriam-
Webster dictionary defines the Jacobite of England as “a partisan of James II of England or of the Stuarts after the 
revolution of 1688.” (Merriam-Webster 2019)  
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capitalize on the fluidity of this term as they decided which Christians were their ‘people’ and 
which ones were not.  
Two weeks before the exchange above took place, Yako brought up an important point, 
not less important than the one brought up by Zigma300. Yako’s message, in contrast to 
Zigma300’s is shorter, and endlessly more cordial. In his message, Yako requested Christian 
priests to unify the Church “and the group of parties” so that they would have a stronger voice in 
Iraq. (yako 2003). Yako’s request unfortunately went unnoticed. While Zigma300’s message 
blamed the Mandaean priests for lack of initiative to save the religion and teach the language to 
the youth, Yako’s message urged the priests to unify separate designations within the Christian 
religion. Doing so, according to Yako, would lead to political unification. In their own ways, 
both messages envision an agency which the priests and, by extension, the religious institutions 
not only lacked, but arguable could never attain. While Zigma300’s vulgarities caused a storm 
within the group, Yako’s polite request passed unnoticed like a breeze in the Christian forum. 
The silence that accompanied this message proved ominous for Iraq’s Christians and their 
political parties. These parties, which until then had promoted language of unity and harmony, 
would soon turn on each other with strong vengeance, revealing serious ideological fissures that 
no discourse could disguise.  
 By October of 2003, the Chaldo-Assyrian National Council was formed.16 On the 
Council’s agenda was a large conference that would include representatives of Chaldeans, 
Assyrians, and Syrians from Iraq and neighboring countries as well as representatives of Paul 
Bremer, the leader of the Provisional Coalition Authority in post-invasion Iraq. The conference 
                                                          
16 Al-Majlis al-qawmi al-Kaldo-Ashuri.  
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was to be held in Baghdad between October 22-4th. On October 5th, the Chaldo-Ashur Society in 
Windsor, Canada, posted a statement congratulating Iraqi Christians on the formation of the new 
Council, but it commented disapprovingly on certain Chaldean actions. Among the issues that 
the Windsor-based Society mentions was a letter addressed to the leader of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq, Paul Bremer, signed by 19 Chaldean priests. The body of the letter 
was not included, but it could be implied from the Society’s message that the letter represented 
an attempt by the Chaldean priests to be recognized officially by the name Chaldean so as to be 
distinguished from Assyrians and other Christian designations. This is indicated by the 
message’s structure which starts off saying “Commenting on the letter signed by the 19 Chaldean 
priests and addressed to Mr. Bremer...we supply the following notes:”. The first note listed states 
that the: 
Chaldo-Ashur Society in Windsor/Canada believes in the unity of our Chaldo-
Assyrian people and in the compound name ‘Chaldo-Assyrian’ for our people and 
in the Syriac language…as a temporary solution to the naming predicament.  
(Emphasis added).  (Society 2003) 
The statement makes it clear that the Windsor based society emphasized unity in name as a first 
step towards a bigger form of unity, one that is religious, cultural and ultimately political.  
The long statement went on listing seven additional points which elucidated the Society’s 
position on the Chaldean’s choice of naming. As the Society saw it, the tag ‘Chaldean’ was a 
misnomer, one that was used historically to designate religious attributes, not a national or an 
ethnic marker as the Chaldeans intended to use it. The name Chaldean hence became “a 
historical mistake in our church’s name, [a name that is given] to every Catholic Assyrian. We 
ask them [the Chaldeans] to correct this mistake as they have a duty to God and to their 
posterity.” (Society 2003).  Here, the Society, was referring to the old accusation that ‘Chaldean’ 
was a name given to the Assyrians (Nestorians) by Pope Pius VIII 1830 to distinguish them from 
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other non-Nestorian Catholics. As can be expected, the Chaldean Democratic Union Party 
(CDU) did not take kindly to this statement. 
The CDU’s thundering response came in close to two weeks after the Windsor Society’s 
statement. Addressing its own followers “the sons of the Chaldean nation, Ummah”, the CDU 
started its response reviewing the recent history of Assyrian attempts to “deny the national 
existence of the Chaldeans.17 This was done, according to the CDU, by overshadowing and 
defacing the Chaldean identity.” The CDU likened the alleged Assyrian cultural aggressions 
against the Chaldeans to the Ba’ath’s policy of denying ethnicity expression in the 1977 census. 
In both cases, according to the CDU, ethnic or national, qawmi, naming was forced on the 
Chaldeans. In a stunning counter attack, the CDU flipped the Society’s accusation on its head, 
claiming that the Assyrians had only gained the name ‘Assyrian’ a century ago. Being new 
comers to the scene who only represented about 10% of Iraq’s Christians, the Assyrians, 
according to the CDU, had changed their failed tactic of denying the existence of Chaldean 
identity at around the year 2000. Since then, they deployed the new tactic of compound naming 
(i.e. Chaldo-Assyrian) in an attempt to “go around the Chaldeans and contain them.” (CDU 
2003). From this point on, the CDU’s counterattack became full-fledged. 
Building on the accusation of cultural containment, which would henceforth gain a 
permanent spot in Chaldean discourse, the CDU enlisted eighteen points detailing the extent of 
the Assyrians’ attempts to dominate their relationship with the Chaldeans. Citing reasons such as 
the Assyrian parties’ lack of transparency and undeclared agenda, the CDU announced pulling 
out of the upcoming Conference in Baghdad. Furthermore, the CDU declared rejecting the 
                                                          
17 Ummah, a large community. In Arabic the word usually refers to a large socio-political, or religious entity such as 
the Muslim world or the Arab world.  
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compound naming convention ‘Chaldo-Assyrian’ and urged all other national parties to reject it 
as well. More importantly, the CDU affirmed the Chaldean desire to have the name Chaldeans 
stated in the constitution separately from other Christians.  By disassociating themselves from all 
other Christian ethnicities in the constitution, the Chaldeans would effectively end any attempt at 
unity among Iraq’s Christians. The ideological difference over the naming convention was not 
simply a Chaldean vs Assyrian issue. As will be shown in the next chapter, some Chaldeans were 
with the name Chaldo-Assyrians and some Assyrians held the belief that each Christian sect was 
a separate ethnicity. A minority among Assyrians believed both groups to be wrong, claiming 
instead that all Iraqi Christians were Assyrians. Whether any one of these views, or none of 
them, were correct is not the contention of the research. What is of value here is that this debate 
became an essential part of symbol-myth driver, to borrow Haddad’s terminology, for the 
activation of the sectarian identities of the different Christian sects. This fact would be solidified 
during the 2005 elections which will be covered in the next chapter.     
The Chaldean Conference eventually took place without the participation of the CDU and 
concluded by forming the Independent Chaldo-Assyrian Council. The opening statement, read 
by the Chaldean bishop Shlaimon Wardoni, explained that the reason behind name Independent 
Chaldo-Assyrian Council was to “unify representation, not liquidate any of the nationalities or 
ethnicities.” (Issa 2003). For the Chaldeans who believed that the Assyrian or Assyrian 
dominated parties such as ZOWAA, were marginalizing them and “containing them” made it 
their point that any representation of the Christians, whether in the constitution had to accept the 
different groups of Christians as separate ethnicities. It is common in the discourse of their 
parties for instance to find reference to the Christians as “Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syriacs.” 
Choosing the compound term would help the Chaldeans in two ways. First, it would ensure that 
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the Chaldeans, as a separate ethnicity, would gain the status of Iraq’s third largest ethnic group. 
The new status would make it hard for Assyrian parties to claim representing them. The second, 
and more important way in which this would help the Chaldeans is in the elections. Separating 
the votes on ethnic basis would ensure the Chaldeans get more votes than other Christian groups.   
The declaration of forming the new Independent Council was undermined on the same 
day by an announcement by the Chaldean News Agency that the preparations had begun for the 
first National Chaldean Conference which was to take place in mid-February of 2004. On the 
agenda for the Chaldean conference was “discussing the future relationship with the Assyrians 
and the Syrians and countering the attempts to deface the Chaldeans’ national identity.” (Agency 
2003). To complete their undermining of the Chaldo-Assyrian Conference, the announcement 
added that the first Chaldean Conference would see the establishment of the National Chaldean 
Council. The sad irony of having two separate Christian councils announced on the same day, 
one practically for the Assyrians while the other strictly for the Chaldeans, set in stone the ethnic 
separation of Iraq’s Christians.    
The clear lack of a strong, unified, political leadership among Iraq’s Christians is 
noteworthy here. The evident proliferation of political parties, committees, and societies 
claiming differing ethnic backgrounds testifies to the fact that the Christians had failed in 
producing a transethnic leadership. The discourse of all the political Christian parties (Chaldean 
and Assyrian) examined in this study never mentions a religious authority like the Patriarch 
Raphael Bidawid I, the Patriarch of Chaldeans of Babylonia (born in 1922 CE, died in 2003 CE). 
This is not to say that the political parties did not abide by the guidance of their religious 
authorities, but in as much as the evidence looked at in this study is concerned, these parties 
acted autonomously, mainly out of ethnic motives. Describing themselves as “national parties of 
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our people,” Iraq’s Christian parties seemed to clearly regard above all else their individual 
nationalities, qawmiat, which actually meant ethnicities. Their religious authorities, well 
intentioned as they might have been, could not bridge the ethnic divide as Yako’s message from 
earlier had indicated. Much like the Mandaeans who had priests but lacked a spiritual leadership, 
the Christians had party leaders and religious leaders, but lacked a strong, unifying political 
leadership.  
Iraq’s Christians showed more organization, politically and culturally, than the 
Mandaeans around the time of the invasion. Having benefited from the democratic conditions in 
Iraq’s Kurdistan region in the late nineties, they reinforced their presence in the region and their 
political parties flourished, continuing their work in Baghdad after the invasion. Their short-lived 
attempts at unity, however, remained superficial. Like Mandaeans, Iraq’s Christians lacked 
internal cohesion. This lack surfaced before the Chaldo-Assyrian Conference which was the first 
attempt to make their compound name official.  
Only a few months before the invasion, Mandaeans faced political choices that put their 
unity to the test. They chose to disengage from politics on sectarian basis and barely managed to 
stay united. The Christians on the other hand spoke about ethnic unity at the level of naming, but 
they failed to translate that unity into a reality on the ground. Within just a few months of the 
invasion, serious ethnic fractures became visible on the façade of Iraq’s Christians. As the 
following chapter aims to show, being left to their own means in an increasingly sectarian Iraq, 
both the Mandaeans and the Christians would turn inward, creating and circulating mythologies 
about their ancient histories to justify their existence in Iraq. They would also adopt a discourse 







Chapter Two: Sectarian Identities Exploding 
 
The American invasion of Iraq and the replacement of the Ba’ath rule government of the 
country with a sectarian based form of government left Iraq’s minorities in shock. Caught off 
guard by the new reality, they now confronted a new political system which they needed to 
participate in but did not exactly know how. Lacking leadership and inner cohesion as we saw in 
the previous chapter, they turned inward. Despite their differences, both the Mandaeans and the 
Christians reacted in similar ways to the new political reality. Their initial reaction was two-fold, 
intellectual and political. Intellectually, they looked for their ethnic origins, sought myths that 
helped them better conceive of their sectarian identities. The different ethnic groups brandished 
competing myths about their origins. The Christians claimed an uninterrupted ethnic history in 
Iraq extending more than six thousand years. The Mandaeans went much further, claiming that 
their religion started with Adam, the first human being, and continued unchanged ever since. 
Politically, they all played the sectarian game. Politically, they participated in the two rounds of 
elections that took place at the beginning and end of 2005. Their participation was on a more or 
less ethnic basis. Interestingly, disappointments in the elections did not cause them to abandon 
their sectarian polarizations. On the contrary, political upsets made them invest in their divisions 
further, joining and forming bigger coalitions that preserved, if not encouraged, their different 
ethnic identities.  
With time, Mandaeans and Christians moved into a more developed stage of identity 
forging, that of myth making. I use the word myth to refer to the combination of fact and fiction 
essential for the creation of group identities. In doing so, I rely on Haddad’s notion of myth-
symbol complexes and its importance in the expression of sectarian identity. I recognize that 
Haddad had Shi’is and Sunnis in mind when conceiving of this notion, not non-Muslim 
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minorities. On one level, he examined the centrality of religious symbols such as al-Hussein’s 
and his step-brother al-Abas in the making of the collective imagination of the Shi’is, and to a 
lesser extent Arab Sunnis.18 On a second level, he identified as myths the competing claims 
between Shi’is and Sunnis as to who suffered the most before and after 2003.  As Haddad points 
out, “[o]ne of the most noticeable features of sectarian identities in post-2003 Iraq have been the 
divergent memories of the Ba’ath-era and the different conceptions of the post-2003 order.” 
(Haddad 2011, p.147). Such claims hold true for Iraq’s Mandaeans and Christians as well.  
The myths that Mandaeans and Christians propagated increasingly after the invasion laid 
down the ground for their sectarian identities to emerge and be stated ever more loudly. The 
proliferation of violence and abductions of members of both minorities understandably 
reaffirmed this sense of group identity. Remarkably, neither the Mandaeans nor the Christians 
would take part in the sectarian violence that would escalate between the Shi’is and the Sunnis. 
Despite adopting a sectarian worldview to express their political aspirations, both Mandaeans 
and Christians remained peaceful and descried violence in all its forms against all their 
adversaries.  
“I was a 100% secular” 
 
                                                          
18 The events at Karbala refer to the the story of the Battle of Karbala which took place in 680, or in the year 61 of 
the Islamic, Hijri calendar near a location where the Iraqi city of Karbala exists today. In this short, but tragic, 
encounter between al-Husayn ibn Ali, who is the prophet’s grandson, his step-brother, al-Abbas ibn Ali, his family 
members and other companions on the one side and the army of the head of the Umayyad dynasty, Yazid I, on the 
other side ended in solidifying the position of the Umayyads as the undisputed leaders of Muslims. Al-Husayn, al-
Abbas and others in his family and among his companions faced gory deaths at the hands of Yazid’s followers. The 
magnanimity of the Battle of Karbala left an indelible impact among the Shi’is and is commemorated every year for 
ten days during the Hijri month of Muharram. For more information, see https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-
of-Karbala. Accessed on 4/26/2019.  
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Mandaeans on the Yahoo Group started 2004 with a debate on whether they should 
become a missionary religion. By becoming a missionary religion, if such a move could be 
contemplated, Mandaeans would gain the benefit of attracting new followers through marriage 
among other means.  The fear of Mandaean youth marrying out of their “fathers’ religion” 
periodically emerges in discussions among diaspora Mandaeans. Arguing for the end of 
endogamy through missionary activity, Ziad Sbahi stated that “[t]his measure caused us great 
harm as our numbers declined and our ideology became RUSTY” (Z. Sbahi 2004). Attracting 
new blood into the religion, according to Sbahi, would give it a new life. He did not explain what 
exactly caused him to think that Mandaeans, as religion, community, or culture, was 
experiencing a decline, but that anxiety was not uncommon among diaspora Mandaeans as we 
saw earlier. Some group members disagreed with Sbahi’s proposal. In their arguments, one can 
see the seeds of a myth germinating. 
Replying to Sbahi, Rana Salam beseeched Sbahi, and those who agreed with him, to 
“please…keep your self to your fathers religion.”19 Salam’s defense of Mandaeans emanated 
from two separate convictions, logical and religious. The logical conviction was based on the 
reasoning that Mandaeans who marry outsiders, such as Muslims, will end up becoming 
Muslims. This is because Islam, according to Salam, does not allow converts to revert back to 
their original religions. As for religious conviction, Salam argued that the Mandaean religion is 
better than, say Islam, because it is the first religion known to man.  
“We are from Adam so we are the oldest religon,, thay are [meaning Muslims] just 1400 years… 
.” (Salam 2004). By claiming Mandaean to be the first religion (or ethnic group?) which 
                                                          
19 Typos appear in the original. 
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descended from Adam, the first man, Salam was only repeating a religious myth which came to 
be a common narrative of the Mandaean origin despite lack of historical evidence.20 Salam 
reported the myth as a factual statement, one that did not require any questioning. Other 
Mandaeans shared her convictions too.  
 One of the most important parallels to Salam’s argument came from a well-respected 
religious figure, Alaa Nashmi, the same charismatic priest who had weighed in on the Zigma 
Storm in the previous chapter. Nashmi published a piece on the Mandaean religion in which he 
answered ten questions on various Mandaean topics including their origin. Using quotes from the 
Ginza Rba, the Mandaean holy book, Nashmi repeats Salam’s myth, albeit in more detail 
claiming that “the Mandaean religion differs from other religions in that it has no human 
founder, it is simply the innate law, or shariah, of life, [sharsha ed hai] which the father of 
mankind, Adam, knew and abode by. (Nashmi 2011).21 The Mandaean religion, as Nashmi sees 
it, predates even humans. The abstract nature of such a conception of religion lends itself to the 
realm of spirituality. Nashmi does not investigate the epistemological premises of his claim. He 
does not, for instance, explain how he interprets the Mandaean notions of spirit, nature of 
knowledge, and religion, or how any of that relates to the individual. It would be more 
guesswork than anything to attempt extrapolating the meaning of any of these notions based on 
what Nashmi tells us. Yet Nashmi does not attempt a high-level explanation of Mandaean 
                                                          
20 For nuanced and well researched account of the origin of Mandaeans, see Kevin van Bladel’s important book 
From Sasanian Mandaeans to Ṣābians of the Marshes. In this book, Bladel argues that oldest known manuscript by 
an outsider to mention the Mandaeans was an account from the Sassanid period by a certain Bar Konay. Buildinng 
his case on that text as well as other sources, Bladel argues that the Mandaeans must have derived their religion from 
the Kentaean religion sometime around the fifth century. For more details see, Bladel, Kevin T. From Sasanian 
Mandaeans to Ṣābians of the Marshes. Leiden: Brill, 2007   
21 The original text of the Nashmi’s piece, which was posted on Yahoo Group in 2004, is not viewable in the Yahoo 
Group. The same text was later published on Mandaean.dk, which is the website of the Mandaean Charity 
Committee in Scandinavia.  
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theology for the simple reason that his targeted audience consists of mainly Mandaean living in 
diaspora who probably knew very little about their religion.  
Nashmi’s spiritual take on the Mandaean religion, simple, literalist, and under-developed 
as it might be, underpins an important tendency among Mandaeans during that time. It tells us 
that the Mandaeans who used digital media as a source of information, sought simple, if under-
developed, platitudes about their religion. This simplistic tendency replaces a previous, more 
mature attempt to understand the origin of the Mandaeans. 
In the mid-1990s, the Mandaean author Aziz Sbahi wrote The Origins of Sabians and 
their Religious Beliefs which presented a historically grounded narrative of the religion. In his 
book, Sbahi traced the Mandaeans to the Babylonian era. The book was popular enough to have 
had multiple editions printed between 1996 and 2002. More known for his history within the 
Iraqi Communist Party as a secretary of the party, Sbahi wrote a widely-read book on the ICP. 22 
In contrast to Nashmi’s account, Sbahi’s book, seems radical.23 Sbahi concedes that the 
Mandaean religion “could have been affected by one hue or another” of the religions of 
Mesopotamia and the Dead Sea region. Sbahi sees the Mandaean religion to have originated in 
an environment that experienced multiple currents of religious beliefs ranging from the Hellenic 
to the Babylonian, and from Gnostic to Judaic. Through a dynamic exchange of ideas and beliefs 
over many centuries, the Mandaean religion, according to Sbahi, emerged in its most current 
form (A. Sbahi 2002). 
                                                          
22 Decades from the History of the Iraqi Communist Party, known in Arabic as “Uqud min Tarikh al-Hizb el-Shiou’i 
al-Iraqi”  
23 Known in Arabic as “Usul al-Sabe’a al-Mandaeyeen wa Mu’taqadatehim al-Dinia”  
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 Clearly, Sbahi’s view could not have been more different from Nashmi’s. The 
differences start from their sources and work their way up to their conclusions. Sbahi read only 
secondary literature on Mandaeans because of lack of knowledge of Mandaic while Nashmi read 
only the religious texts and ignored all else. For Mandaeans in the post-invasion era however, the 
lightweight, unhistorical, even mythical, view of religion, such as that espoused by Nashmi, had 
the most appeal. This is because such a view afforded the Mandaeans a useful myth on which 
they can found their identity as one of Iraq’s most ancient sects, if not the most ancient of them 
all.  At an era when Iraq’s minorities experienced identity crisis, competition between various 
ethno-religious mythologies thrived.  
Conceiving themselves as the oldest, or one of the oldest sects in Iraq did not offer the 
Mandaeans any protections, however. News of Mandaean individuals targeted and killed, gold 
shops robbed, and individuals kidnapped spread in the Yahoo Group very quickly. 
Understandably, one of the most terrifying incidents for the group members involved the 
kidnapping of a young girl:  
Dear Mandaeans, I was informed that the girl who was kidnapped in 
Baghdad /Zayona on Monday May 25, 2004 is … Her mother is... .The girl is 
in her last year at the College of Technology/Computer Science. She was 
kidnapped in front of her house while she was giving the garbage truck 
operators some charity. (Mutlag 2004) 
The victim was released, according to an update message, after the family had paid ten thousand 
US dollars. Understandably, incidents such as this signaled to the Mandaeans that they were 
immediately targeted. As we will see later, the Christians who had their share of targeted attacks 
had also reached a similar conclusion.  
 Not all the news Mandaeans received in the Yahoo Group were true however. 
Misinformation and fake news of killings and kidnappings spread equally quickly, adding to the 
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chaos that seemed to mark the daily life of psot-invasion Iraq. “Dear friends,” announced one 
message, “We've heard a rumor from San Diego that Shiaa militia massacred 31 Mandaeans 
gathering in the Mendi in Baghdad.” (A. Bahoor 2003). This piece of fake news was soon 
debunked on the ground that a major incident such as this would have resounding repercussions 
among Mandaeans worldwide very quickly had it really happened. Fake as it certainly was, this 
incident, and others, indicate a growing sense of distrust, even fear towards Muslims, especially 
the Shi’i Muslims.  
 Some Mandaeans did not need a proliferation of bad news to reach the grim conclusion 
that they, as a religious minority were being targeted in Iraq. “Ibrahim and Adam are our first 
prophets, they were living in Iraq” claimed Raed Omara from Holland then urged Mandaeans 
inside and outside Iraq to take action. According to him, “[y]ou cann't keep silence if someone 
don't want to justify your exist[e]nce.” (Omara 2004). It is not easy to discern what action was 
Omara exactly calling for. What is clear from his message though is that this action needed to be 
taken by Mandaeans for Mandaeans.  
Omara’s message followed from a thread in which he argued with another group 
member, Aassam Salem, whether it would be better for Mandaeans to stay in Iraq, “our holy 
place from many thousands years” or leave it. Omara’s position is that leaving the spiritual 
homeland will cause Mandaeans to stray away from their religion. In response to Omara, one 
group member, Salem, sums up what he perceives to be an irreconcilable situation for the 
Mandaeans in Iraq in one sentence. “[L]iving among the Muslims is like the fighting” Salem 
states before asking, “way [why] i have to fight !” (Salem 2004). The deep distrust, the 
impossibility of conceiving coexistence with Muslims, and the implied call to abandon Iraq 
reflect some of feelings that Mandaeans harbored towards the reality of post-invasion Iraq. These 
40 
 
feelings proved central in affirming their sectarian identity as Mandaeans, Iraq’s oldest ethno-
religious group. It is this image which would dictate how they expressed themselves politically. 
Other Mandaeans also weighed in on the debate of leaving Iraq or staying and facing the 
unknown. Ghazi Elmanah, an active Yahoo Group member, took Salam’s position. Horrified by 
what is happening in Iraq, he declared that “I am beginning to think that the mandaeans do not 
have a place in Iraq any more.”. For the Mandaeans who believed that their ancestors have lived 
in Iraq since the dawn of time, such a confession must have been not only very painful, but also 
very distressing. He suggested contacting the US State Department, but his suggestion does not 
go far. Elmanahi wonders what would happen to his fellow men “if and when the[y] take power” 
(Elmanahi 2004). By “they” Elmanahi could be meaning either Muslims or Islamists. The 
blurring of the line between the two categories, Muslims and Islamists, indicates a dangerous 
twist in the way Mandaeans, and later Christians, began to view the Muslim other. Elmanahi’s 
ambiguous over-generalization proved to be sufficient to lead others to go far beyond 
ambivalence. 
Responding to Elmanahi, Faheem al-Saleem makes the case that Muslims have always 
been the cause of Iraq’s misery. He read the Islamic conquest of Iraq as a two-stage conversion 
process. First, they “converted the Iraqis into Muslem.” The second, and more interesting stage 
according to al-Saleem, was that they turned Iraqis “into Arab by hook or crook.” Fast forward to 
the modern times, al-Saleem saw a continuity of Muslim oppression. “[T]his had continued,” he 
said, referring to the oppression, “with the Otomans & then with the Sunni King Faisal & his 
family.” For al-Saleem, even the Iraqi monarchy was an oppressive Islamist entity, not because 
of a certain policy that they adopted, but apparently only because they were Muslims. The tirade 
goes on to include the Ba’athis and “their leader,” Saddam Hussein. Al-Saleem has no faith in 
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Shia government either. For him, the Shi’is “have no experience in leading…the country.” He 
goes on to predict that “they will lose” the chance of governing Iraq which is given to them by 
the Americans due to their lack of experience. (F. al-Saleem 2004). 
Trying to mitigate what could turn into a sectarian circus, Suhaib Nashi, the Yahoo 
Group co-founder and moderator, intervened, reminding group members that the people who are 
committing terrorism “are the same people who for the last forty years killed” and committed 
many atrocities against Iraqis.24 Staying optimistic, Nashi reaffirms that “[t]he mandaeans 
survived before and will survive now.” Whether mass migration was the only way to preserve 
Mandaeans, Nashi leaves that up to the Mandaeans living in Iraq to decide. He then assures 
“those who escape for a legitimate reason” that the Union will help them “as much as we can” 
(Nashi 2004).  Calm and reassuring as Nashi’s words they indeed were, they could not persuade 
Mandaeans not to think in sectarian terms. As a matter of fact, his words even failed to convince 
him not to take a sectarian stance as will be seen soon.  
The growing senses of alienation, hopelessness, and oppression combined with a 
crystalizing sense of religious and ethnic identity among Mandaeans manifested themselves in 
the elections. The elections in question here are the National Assembly Elections which were 
held on January 30, 2005. “To make that deadline,” according to The New York Times, “it was 
believed, there was no time to conduct a census or… [draw] district lines.” (Weisman 2005) The 
nationwide election would see 275 members chosen for an assembly tasked with voting on the 
                                                          
24 Nashi’s specific time reference of forty years ago refers to the year 1963. In this year, pro-Nasserist members of 
the army, supported by Ba’ath party members carried out a military coup against the founder of the Iraq republic, 
Abdul Karim Qassim. Qassim’s rule remains popular among many Iraqi leftists today and is very popular among 
Mandaeans in the Yahoo Group as evidenced by Nashi’s reference. (Tripp 2007)    
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new constitution. The elections excited the Mandaeans as it promised change. It also offered 
them the opportunity to exercise sectarian politics.   
The Mandaeans had no strategy to speak of to tackle the elections. Taken, as it were by 
surprise, they neither knew the role they could play in it nor how to go about participating in it. 
More than 3 weeks prior to the election date, confusion was the order of the day. This confusion 
is best summed up in Dr. Ayar Farhan’s email addressed to Suhaib Nashi: 
I would like to know what is the Mandaean idea regarding the election; 
which group are we voting for as Mandaean in Iraq and abroad; is there any 
instruction to vote for our candidates (if there is any) and in which list are 
there[they] placed, and why in this list? 25 Or is it left for individuals to vote 
whatever they want? Or are we using tactical vote, that is difficult to control if 
we have a proportional representation in place? Do we have any instruction 
from Iraq on this matter? (A. Farhan 2005). 
 
Farhan’s email clearly shows concern for the Mandaeans’ position within the elections. His 
confusion could also be interpreted as an anxiety that the Mandaeans might not benefit from the 
elections if they were not prepared for it. He did not know if the Mandaeans were to vote for a 
specific coalition or a specific candidate. In other words, he did not know whether to vote on a 
sectarian basis or personal, ideological preference. The anxious undertone of the message implies 
that the lack of planning needs to be addressed, with urgency. His suggestion regarding tactical 
votes retains some vagueness. It does imply though that without a clear plan and agreed upon 
candidate, the elections would not benefit the Mandaeans.  
 Farhan’s message above closes with a very interesting question. It asks whether there had 
been any guidance from Iraq on this matter. This question reflects not only the deep concern that 
                                                          
25 The word list means political coalition. Qaem’a, which in translates literally to list, is the term usually used in 
Iraq’s elections.   
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Mandaeans in diaspora had for their co-religionists back home, but also a readiness, if not an 
expectation, that Mandaeans in Iraq should take the lead in organizing and guiding the Mandaean 
vote. Likewise, his closing question implies yet another question, namely what they would do if 
they did not have instructions from Iraq. The Mandaeans recognized the opportunity that the 
2005 elections, rushed and haphazard as it was, presented them to enter Iraq’s political arena.     
 For Salam Farhan, who wrote replying to Ayar Farhan, the answer was simple. Writ in 
upper case letters to maximize the emphasis, he urged “ALL MY FELLOW MANDAEANS” to  
“PLEASE CONCENTRATE ON THIS =OUR RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION,,,THE 
FUTURE OF OUR COMMUNITY ,,THEIR RIGHTS.” What is at stake for Farhan is nothing 
less than the very future of Mandaeans. Their rights, as he sees them, depend on the constitution. 
The constitution, according to him must be changed to include the name Mandaean. This is a 
necessity for him because “the mandaeans” he said “[have] never ever [been] mentioned in the 
constitution before.” (S. Farhan 2005). Farhan, like other Mandaeans and Christians who spoke 
of the need of having their religion or sect mentioned in the constitution, viewed that as an 
ultimate goal by itself. This fact signals the tendency among Iraqi minorities in the wake of the 
invasion to hold the constitution in very high regard. 
 If Farhan’s goal was to have the Mandaeans mentioned in the new constitution, the way 
he saw to making that happen was through was very straightforward: to have a Mandaean 
elected. “we want and need badly and desperately” he says, “some one--mandaean--to succeed to 
be a member to act for his own community to docu[m]ent our rights.”  The key word, in Farhan’s 
plan is someone Mandaean. As Farhan understands it, only a Mandaean can represent 
Mandaeans in the political sphere. To this end, he again urged his fellow-Mandaeans, again in 
his all-caps style, to postpone “ALL OTHER MATTERS NOW…OUR OBJECTIVE IS 
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HAVING OUR RIGHTES DOCUMMENTED IN THE CONSTITUTION” (S. Farhan 2005).  
Farhan’s call for the Mandaeans to bypass all their differences and agree on working together to 
gain legal recognition resonated with other group members. For some members, the call for a 
Mandaean vote became more than just a call, but akin to an imperative. 
 Even before any confirmations of Mandaean candidates participating in the elections had 
come out, the expectation was that some Mandaeans would run for the elections and, more 
importantly, “we should support” them. For example, Alaa Nashmi, the young priest we 
encountered earlier, showed a rather lenient stance as he was willing to support any candidates 
viewed as “liberal, secular, [and] believe in the rights of minorties” (Nashmi 2005). As a man of 
religion, Nashmi only recognized secular and liberal candidates as being sensitive to minorities 
rights and, therefore, worthy of “our” vote. By contrast, the Mandaean candidate, in Nashmi’s 
view, did not need to be secular or liberal to gain the Mandaean vote because, Nashmi presumed, 
they will naturally seek the benefit of “our community.”  
The implication of Nashmi’s position is that non-secular Muslims will not work for the 
benefit of minorities. Interestingly, some of the Mandaeans like Nashmi saw sectarian politics, if 
applied by Muslim Iraqis to be problematic. They recognized that sectarian politics, a politics 
based on religious difference such as the Shi’i – Sunni politics, would certainly overlook the 
rights of minorities within the system they participate in it. Yet, these same Mandaeans could 
only see themselves participating in politics on sectarian basis, as Mandaeans. The attempt here 
is not to pass a judgment on how Mandaeans chose to express their sectarian identity politically. 
As Fanar Haddad reminds us “the morally charged and negative connotations of the term 
“sectarianism” preclude its usage in a meaningful way” (Haddad 2011, p.25). Rather, the goal 
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here is to understand how Mandaeans, or more specifically the Mandaeans presented in the 
Yahoo Group, conceived of projecting their sectarian identity in the new Iraqi political space.   
 Nashmi’s ambivalent position towards the non-Mandaean candidates who might 
champion the Mandaean cause proved too ‘liberal’ for some group members. Furat al-Saleem for 
one, made it the duty of Mandaeans to elect a Mandaean, and only Mandaean, candidate at all 
costs. After coming across unconfirmed news that an unidentified “Mandaean figure” would join 
a political coalition. or list, called the People’s Union, he immediately assumed “that this is the 
list we are endorsing.” Who the candidate was, what ideological currents shaped their political 
preferences, and more importantly, why should other Mandaeans ignore any of these 
considerations when choosing that candidate are some of the many questions that al-Saleem 
avoids when making his assumption. The matter, as al-Saleem presented it, did not warrant a 
debate at all. Even before confirming whether a Mandaean would indeed be in the People’s 
Union, he urged all Mandaeans to vote for People’s Union “regardless of your ideology.”  (F. al-
Saleem 2005). When a Mandaean candidate was finally confirmed to run for the elections, al-
Saleem’s view becomes standard among the group members.  
 Mandaeans of the Yahoo Group did not wait long before the news was announced. 
Roughly a week after the thread above transpired, a formal announcement was shared on the e-
group by none other than Nashi himself. Written in red letters, the title of the massage declared 
“Yes For Subhi al-Mubarak, the Upcoming Mandaean Candidate for the Iraqi Parliament.” 
Penned by the candidate’s campaign coordinator, Samera Sibahi Khalaf, the announcement 
confirmed al-Saleem’s rumor. Mubarak was running in the People’s Union coalition. 
Alternatively known as Coalition 324, the People’s Union, according to Khalaf, is a coalition 
that has a “democratic, secular program.” (Khalaf 2005). Khalaf did not give details on the 
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nature of the People’s Union, its political agenda, and how it was formed or funded. What she 
told us, instead, was that this coalition included representatives of the Chaldeans and Yazidis. 
Khalaf also gave a short biography of Subhi Mubarak. Assuring readers that he was “born to a 
Mandaean family.” He took on multiple roles within Iraq’s General Mandaean Council.26 He was 
elected Secretary-General of the Council, according to Khalaf still, after the invasion. With his 
experience at the Council and the excitement that seemed to enwrap his campaign, Mubarak’s 
star quickly rose. 
 The excitement was hard to contain indeed. Following Mubarak’s formal announcement, 
Yahoo Group members started a race of endorsements. Faheem al-Saleem suggested “voting for 
Subhi [Mubarak] right no[w]” within the Yahoo Group as a way to measure support for the 
Mandaean candidate within the online community. (F. al-Saleem 2005). Voting never took place 
as al-Saleem had suggested but calls for endorsement in the form of “I too [e]ndorse Subhi 
Mubark” proliferated very quickly. The overwhelming support within the group prompted a 
group member to suggest calling Mubarak “Mahboob el-Jamahir,” Arabic for fan favorite. (Al-
Sam 2005). Fan favorite is an apt description for Mubarak, especially since he apparently was 
not the only Mandaean to run for the elections. We know of at least one other Mandaean, Riyad 
Radhi, who ran for the same elections from his hometown of Basra and was registered under the 
National Reconciliation coalition, headed by Ayad Alawi. Unfortunately, Radhi was brutally 
assassinated with his son on his way back home from work one day before the elections. 
(Zahroon 2005). Despite his tragically short run, Radhi’s candidacy garnered no interest among 
the Yahoo Group Mandaeans, for whom Mubarak remained unrivaled. 
                                                          
26  In Arabic it is Majlis ‘Umum al-‘Taefa al-Manda’yia. 
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 The endorsements for Mubarak’s campaign peaked when the group moderator, Suhaib 
Nashi, publicly endorsed him. Before the invasion, Nashi had unequivocally rejected to 
participate in the opposition conference in London because that would have been a participation 
on sectarian basis. Less than three years later, the same Nashi was urging the Mandaeans to 
publicly endorse “the representative that you think will serve the Mandaean[s] [the]most” and 
adding “I personally will indorse Subhi Mubark.” (Nashi 2005). Nashi went even further still, as 
if his full, public endorsement was not sufficient, he shared a message from Um Yahya from 
Denmark who said she would defy her old age, blindness, and poor health and head to the voting 
center with three interpreters to cast her vote for “the son of Mubarak…with hope that my 
participation would benefit our people in Iraq.” Nashi commented on Um Yahya’s words saying, 
with a hint of religious zeal, “May Hayy (God) keep you as a symbol for us.” (Nashi 2019). In a 
short period of less than three years, Nashi’s staunch secularism transformed into sectarian 
peacocking.  Some group members found that change objectionable. 27 
 Reacting to the whole trend of endorsing Coalition 324 (aka the People’s Union) some 
group members criticized the overt sectarian attitude of the group. Layla al-Roomi, Nashi’s 
sister, became “angry” because some group members were “asking people to vote for 324 
because there is one mandean name in it.”  She asked rhetorically “where is your s[e]cular non[-] 
s[e]ctarion appro[a]ch to the iraqi problem [?]” Al-Roomi’s almost unique position within the 
group reflects the great change that overcame the Mandaean approach to politics. Speaking with 
a collective voice, she explained that “we do not want to change into another [en]tirely 
                                                          
27 Nashi would later argue that Mandaeans have no safe home in Iraq anymore in a co-authored article with John 
Bolender, Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. 
Highlighting the exodus of large numbers of Mandaeans from Iraq following the U.S. led invasion and the targeted 
persecution many of them experienced, Nashi and Bolender call on the international community, and in particular 
the US and EU, to adopt Honderich’s Principle of Humanity and take in all the Mandaean refugees “to prevent this 
humanitarian disaster from continuing.” (Suhaib Nashi & John Bolender 2009) 
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rel[i]gious group.” The only way forward, according to her, was through working within the 
larger socio-political sphere as part of the Iraqi whole. She then went on to call for “respect and 
tolera[nce]” to replace “hatred” towards other “religions and cultures.” (Layla al-Roomi 2005) 
 Al-Roomi’s important critique woke up some ambivalent feelings that otherwise would 
have remained unvoiced. Wondering how he ended up sectarian, Faheem al-Saleem responded to 
Layla in a message that can serve as eulogy to a secular zeitgeist that had once prevailed in Iraq. 
“I am just divided” he tells al-Roomi, “between my deep secular feelings and my Mandaean 
Gnostic feelings!” These two sides of him never reconciled with each other it seems. Recounting 
what must now be a distant past at the time he was in his twenties, he said “I have never been 
like this.I was a 100% secular.” “Was” is the keyword in this statement, for “nowadays,” he 
lamented, “things look different.” By different, he of course meant sectarian. Al-Saleem could 
neither explain his past secularism nor his current sectarian attitudes. He did not understand how 
he became sectarian, yet he sought to justify it as a means to protecting the rights of Mandaeans. 
“By hook or crook,” he said, repeating his old idiom, “we need every vote.”  The idealism that 
had once colored his past has morphed into a realism that dictated his present. (F. al-Saleem 
2005). This was true of al-Saleem as well as many others of his generation of Mandaeans and 
Christians, not to say Iraqis in general. Political oppression, wars, invasion, migrations, and other 
forces beyond their control or comprehension must have disrupted their existence in ways hard to 
imagine, leaving them isolated and forgotten, their world confined to their religious and ethnic 
sects.  
Al-Roomi’s rhetoric of inclusiveness and collaboration had generated mild support within 
the group, but ultimately failed to persuade anyone within the group, including al-Roomi herself, 
to vote for any coalition other than 324. Al-Roomi argued that she was voting for 324 “because it 
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is the only non-sectarian non rel[i]giuos group.” (Layla al-Roomi 2005). A few other group 
members agreed with her, but that position ultimately made no difference since they all voted, or 
said they would vote, for 324. Yet even with all that support, the total Mandaean left not a dent 
on the election’s outcome.  
The election concluded with the Shi’i majority United Coalition as the clear winner with 
Da’wa party’s head, Ibrahim al-Ja’fary eventually heading the government. Subhi Mubarak did 
not make it. Going into the elections, Nashi as well as other Mandaeans admitted that they did 
not “feel so optimistic... I think Itehad Al-Shaab will get about 5% (+/-).” (Nashi 2005). The 
failure of Mandaean’s first true sectarian approach to politics however proved to be a much-
needed reality check. Democracy did not guarantee representation as the Mandaeans were to 
learn. For the Mandaeans, the true lesson of the elections was that it altered them to the 
importance of revising their approach.  
Failure in the elections prompted Mandaeans to look into their political approach and 
revise it. Some doubled down on sectarian politics, blaming the election’s failure on what they 
saw as the fragmented political outlook of their co-religionists. Championing this view in a 
discussion thread with Suhaib Nashi, Dr Ayar Farhan maintained that “[w]e should learn from 
this experience for next time…let…us have ONE organization purely Mandaean one no…other, 
to nominate our candidates.” Farhan’s position originated from a strong feeling of 
disappointment. His choice to blame those who did not vote or voted for coalitions other than 
324, might be viewed as a typical case of scapegoating, but it is also not a surprising reaction, 
given that this is the first democratic exercise for many of them. (A. Farhan 2005). 
Suhaib Nashi did not see eye to eye with Farhan. Having developed a better sense of the 
election process, Nashi was certain that “we could not put one person in the Parliament no matter 
50 
 
what.” Breaking down the causes of the failure, Nashi admitted that Mandaeans did not have 
“enough numbers that will agree on one candidate.” To make up numbers, Nashi believed that 
Mandaeans needed to collaborate with other minorities such as the “Christians, Yazidies, Shebek 
and others” who found themselves in a similar situation. (A. Farhan 2005).28 The minorities’ 
candidate who would make it to the parliament, according to Nashi, should represent all of them. 
There was another option, Nashi told us, which was discussed by Mandaean delegates with the 
Committee that would aid in writing the constitution in March. According to the new proposal, 
minorities “should have reserved seats in the parliament as the situation of the Pakistani 
Constitution.” Pleasantly surprised by Nashi’s well-thought response, Farhan readily agreed with 
the idea of a coalition of minorities, and suggested, with visible excitement, that “we should 
work on it from now.” (A. Farhan 2005).  
Although their first exercise in democracy failed, Mandaeans realized more or less that 
they could not win a sectarian game in place where they constitute a very small minority, and 
when large numbers of this small minority lived in diaspora. The myths they propagated about 
being the as old as mankind, gave them a false idea in their sect’s place in Iraq’s demographic 
picture. The worsening security situation was conducive to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments, 
which pushed some of them to view the whole history of Mandaean existence under Muslim rule 
as a history of continuous oppression. A sectarian outlook to politics, by and large, determined 
their choice of candidate in the first parliamentary elections after the invasion.  
Not all Mandaeans harbored sectarian feelings and a serious debate into the nature, and 
value, of sectarian politics for Mandaeans took place before the elections. Fearful of a Muslim 
                                                          
28 Nashi’s discussion is taken from the same thread of Ayar Farhan’s message. 
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majority government and lack of representation, most Mandaeans, who by no means were not the 
only Iraqi sect to do so, were prone to act on sectarian impulses and choose to vote for a coalition 
that had a Mandaean candidate in the belief that he will fairly represent them. It was only when 
the elections concluded with their candidate not winning a seat that Mandaeans realized that they 
needed stronger coalitions, mainly with other minorities, to ensure some representation. In doing 
so, they realized that as a single sect, in the current political system, they lacked the numbers to 
gain any representation. They began thinking of joining bigger coalitions but did so on a purely 
sectarian basis.  
 
“Are you with the Chaldeans or the Assyrians…?” 
 
Although the post-invasion Christian political scene varied a great deal from the 
Mandaean’s, many similarities existed. Feeling neglected by the temporary constitution and 
being targeted by terrorist attacks, the Christians, like the Mandaeans, turned inward. To 
supposedly record the heritage of Iraqi Christian, they called for a calendar that predated 
Christianity. They started remembering their recent history under the Ottomans and in modern 
day Iraq as one of continuous oppression against the Christians, a claim that elicited sectarian, 
anti-Muslim sentiments. Yet despite agreeing on parts of this narrative, the Christians continued 
to invest in their ethnic differences fighting, verbally, fiercer than ever before. As the 2005 
elections drew closer, Chaldeans and Assyrians and other Christians organized themselves into 
separate political coalitions according to their views on the issue of ethnicity, hence cementing 
their divisions further still.  
52 
 
The year 2004 saw multiple terrorist attacks on Iraq’s Christians. Most notable among 
those were a series of apparently coordinated bombings on a number of churches in Baghdad and 
Mosul, the two Iraqi cities with the largest population of Christians outside Kurdistan. The 
attacks left no less than ten dead and scores injured (ankawa.com 2004). These attacks continued 
a terrifying trend that started after the invasion and saw multiple attacks and kidnappings of 
Christians, including the gruesome murder of a septuagenarian nun in 2002.29 The 2004 attacks 
marked an escalation which would only worsen over time. Two kinds of reactions emanated 
from the attacks. The first kind of reaction was directed at the Christian parties who were likened 
to “shops, whose owners are only interested in buying and selling at the expense of the people 
whose name they stole.” The site member who wrote this reply, Jamil Rafael, went on to say that 
“I get a quiver of anger every time I hear a party called Christian, or Chaldean, or Assyrian, or 
Syriac” (ankawa.com 2004). Rafael directed his anger at the political parties who used or “stole” 
as he put it, the ethnic or religious names to achieve personal gains. This view was not unlike 
that of the Mandaean Zigma300 who smeared the Mandaean priesthood for what he saw as 
neglecting their duties. Among both Christians and Mandaeans, there seemed to have been a 
number of politically and religiously uninvolved individuals, the so-called ordinary people, who 
would not hesitate to blame their religious or political authorities whenever they think they failed 
them. They represented an outlier at any case as not many people espoused their strongly worded 
views. 
The second, more important reaction harbored an anti-Islamic sentiment. Instances of 
such a reaction could be traced to earlier events targeting Christians. In 2003, Nabil Daman 
                                                          
29 It was not uncommon for news of this sort to be circulated on the Mandaean Yahoo Group or for news regarding 
Mandaeans to be shared on ankawa.com.  
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wrote on ankawa.com complaining about what he saw as an “Usuli” and “Salafi” (i.e. 
fundamental Islamist) attempt ban alcohol shops in Iraq, a measure that could impact, according 
to Daman, the livelihood and the freedom of choice of Christians. While ridiculing the 
effectiveness of such a measure, the incident reawakened in Daman memories of religious 
oppression that, he feared, might come back to life. “I remember in the seventies,” he recalled, 
“how the police used to hover around areas of Christians and Yazidis in Ramadan to humiliate 
and imprison who ever lights a cigarette or drinks a cup of water in the heat of the summer.” 
(Daman 2003). It is not clear if Daman was implying that Iraq’s police in the seventies were 
Salafi Islamists in any way, or whether they were lay-Muslims acting out of pious impulses. He 
did not seem to distinguish between a state sponsored fundamentally religious police force and a 
number of pious policemen in an otherwise secular police force. Not that such a distinction 
would probably matter to him anyway. As far as he, a member of a religious minority, was 
concerned the authority, by and large Muslim, showed intolerance towards a minority group he 
identified with. It is this implication that won him the affinity of other group members.  
Once one starts viewing the world in the binary form of a religious majority versus a 
minority, it becomes hard to draw clear boundaries. Like some Mandaeans who viewed the 
Monarchy as being an oppressive Islamic state, some Christians saw Iraq in the seventies, by all 
accounts one of the most secular forms of government in the region at the time, as religiously 
intolerant, Islamist state. While Mandaeans viewed the history of Islam as one of continuous 
persecution of Mandaeans, Christians went as far back as World War I, to re-read the Armenian 
Massacre as part of a larger Christian Massacre. This massacre was committed, according to a 
shared statement by multiple Christian groups, by “the leaders of Ottoman empire, and their aids 
and local tribal agents.” The massacre was, according to the same group, “planned and intended” 
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against the “Chaldeans, Syriacs, Assyrians” to “end the civilization that dates back thousands of 
years and the shared values of the Christians who have inhabited this region… ” (Syriacs 
Gathering Movement 2004).30 Like the Shi’is and the Sunnis who competed over whose 
narrative of victimhood, as Haddad would put it, was more tragic, the Christians, like the 
Mandaeans, looked back at their history and viewed it as a continuum of religious oppression, 
one in which they featured as the perpetual victims.   
Similar to the Mandaeans who used myths to affirm their group identity as the most 
ancient religion, the Christians thought of themselves as Iraq’s original inhabitants. In a meeting 
in Naṣiriyah in 2003 which included more than 100 representatives of various Iraqi political 
factions, a representative of the Democratic Assyrian Party reminded the attendees that Iraq’s 
history goes back “not just 1400 years, but 7000 years.” The representative was hinting at the 
fact that Muslims were not the earliest inhabitants of Iraq, but latecomers compared to the 
Christians (Zowaa 2003). This claim was later backed by a precise calendar for the year 7305-6 
which corresponded with the year 2006 (Almalih 2005).  On their part, the Chaldeans also made 
                                                          
30 The story behind the massacres of the Christians in Iraq during the World War I is not as straightforward as this 
view presents it. In Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908-1918, 
Michael A. Reynolds sheds light on the issue by placing the Christians of Anatolia, which included the Armenians 
and Iraq’s Christians, in the historical and imperial contexts of the war. Caught up in the bitter struggle between the 
failing empires, the Ottoman and the Russian, the minorities in the borderland areas were supported by the Russian 
empire in an attempt to create a pro-Russian front inside the Ottoman empire that could prove useful in the event of 
a Russian invasion. The Russian empire therefore supplied them with weapons and in fact these armed groups, 
according to Reynolds, killed thousands of Turks. Retaliating with a brute force familiar among the imperial powers 
of the time, the Ottomans, led by the Unionists reformers, carried out a vicious campaign against the Armenians the 
goal of which, according to Reynolds “was if not the extermination of the Armenian community, then the 
devastation of it such that it could no longer have a credible claim to Eastern Anatolia.” (Reynolds 2011, p.152). 
Other ethnic groups such as the Kurds and Jews also faced similar fates to the Armenians. According to Reynolds, 
potentially as many as one million Armenians out of a population of possibly one and half million perished in the as 
a result of the Ottoman campaign. The Christians, according to Reynolds, suffered losses “comparable in 
proportionate terms “to those of the Armenians. For more details, see Michael A. Reynolds. Shattering Empires: 




similar claims regarding their origins.31 Whether these calendars are accurate or not, or whether 
the historical claim which the calendar makes was based on any factual evidence is not the 
contention of this paper. The argument to be made here is the following: After the invasion, 
minorities felt the need to reassert their group identities, true, imagined or a bit of both, and to 
seek to authenticate these identities through claiming, rightly or wrongly, a prehistorical 
connection to the land. This tendency indicates an anxiety that minorities felt after the changing 
political scene, probably to a degree they had not felt before.  
 Some Christians built on the many similarities shared among their co-religionists in an 
attempt to bridge the widening divide between the Chaldeans and the Assyrians. Alas, the push 
back against such attempts pronounced the divisions even louder than before. Early in February 
of 2004, a call for unifying the Christian churches of Iraq under one name went very much 
unnoticed. (Ibrahim 2004). A month earlier, a more organized effort was initiated with the 
promising formation of the Assyrian Unifying Front.32 The front claimed its goal to “devise a 
strategic plan to address the Coalition Authority, the Governing Council, and the international 
society regarding the demands of the Assyrian nation…” (Front 2004). The vague nature of the 
goals of the Front as well as the names of the individuals who formed it and signed the 
foundation statement drew much criticism from ankawa.com’s members. Serious accusations 
mounted against the Front’s members linking them to the Ba’ath party and blaming them for 
                                                          
31 See for example the Chaldean author Amer H. Fatuhi’s book, Chaldeans/ Kaldani Since the Early Beginning of 
Time 5300 B.C. – 2004. The book focuses on the “continuous ethnic presence” of the Chaldeans in Iraq since the 
antiquities. (Fatuhi 2007). Also, contrast this view with Shak Hanish’s examination of the history Iraq’s Christians 
which, he argues, has no records earlier than the ninth century B.C., a date that is much later than many of Iraq’s 
Christians would accept. (Hanish 2008) 
32 In Arabic it is al-Jabha al-Ashuria al-Wuhdawia.  
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undermining the cause of the Assyrian people. (Front 2004). The Front’s attempt seemed to have 
been born dead as the Front’s name vanished soon after it was announced.  
 Other unifying attempts among diaspora Christians proved more successful than the 
Front’s. Assyrochaldean Students and Youth Union of Michigan (A. S. Y. U. M.) represents one 
such attempt. Although described by the participants as a “confusing” experience, A. S. Y. U. M. 
met at least twice. In the second meeting, the 20 or so young members who held the meeting 
agreed “to keep any relation to politics or religions out of A.S.Y.U.M.” (Stephan 2004). Another 
unifying attempt came from Linköping, Sweden with the formation of the Chaldean, Syriac, 
Assyrian Ethnic Council to “support the unification process.” The Linköping Council provided 
an overview of the nature of their work and the discussions that took place among its participants 
going back to December of the previous year. The Linköping Council found it important that 
Christians should “avoid debating the naming issue at length in order to settle it while [we are 
still] at this elementary stage of unification.” The naming issue, according to the Linköping 
Council required “calm and studied” seminars and discussions in order to properly address it. 
(Khoshaba 2003). Both the A. S. Y. U. M. and Linköping Council succeeded, however 
marginally, in bringing Christians together because they avoided debating the contentious 
naming issue. Unlike them, Christians inside Iraq did not have the luxury of avoiding that issue.  
 The calls for unity from overseas did not cause the widening divide between the different 
Christian political parties. Of these, the Assyrian party ZOWAA and the Chaldean Democratic 
Union Party (CDU), leading armies of indoctrinated intellectuals on each side, were the main 
rivals. The ideological differences between the two parties were embodied in the persons who 
headed them. Yonadam Kanna, the head of ZOWAA was a staunch believer in the Assyrian 
nature of all of Iraq’s Christians. On the other hand, Ablhad Afraim who headed the CDU 
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believed wholeheartedly in the Chaldean specificity, so much so that he wrote a two-volume 
book in Arabic entitled History of the Chaldeans in addition to a large number of other books 
and essays on the Chaldeans. He once said that any Christian who would not accept the 
precedence of the Chaldeans over other Christians is a “traitor.” (ankawa.com 2005)   
Despite their clear ideological differences, both Kanna and Afraim shared a lot in 
common, so much so that the first stages of their biographies could be mistaken for each other’s. 
To start with, both were born in 1951. By 1991, both were actively participating in the uprising 
against Saddam Hussein’s regime following the Second Gulf War. In that same year, both of 
them participated in a short-lived movement that attempted to unite the Chaldeans and the 
Assyrians. Soon afterwards, they found themselves holding high positions in Kurdistan’s then 
nascent independent government under the rule of Masoud Barazani. Kanna became a Minister 
of Labor and Housing for elven years then a Minister of Industry and Energy for two years. In 
July 2003, he was chosen by the Coalition Administration to be a member in the Governing 
Council. He was the only Christian to be chosen for that role (zowaa.org 2018).  
Afraim’s luck was more mediocre than that of his archrival. After the unification attempt 
of 1991 had failed, Afraim also entered the parliamentary elections in Kurdistan, as did Kanna, 
but he ended up with the less glamorous position of a Deputy Minister. Afraim claimed that he 
was given that position as a compensation for the rigged elections which saw the parliamentary 
seat he won “taken by force and in an illegal way.” Afraim boasted of using his position in 
government to help his fellow Chaldeans with jobs and humanitarian aid. A large part of 
Afraim’s career was spent protecting Chaldean identity and advancing cultural goals. For 
instance, he is credited with stopping a mosque from being built next to a Chaldean church in the 
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Duhok province, he wrote the national Chaldean anthem, and he represented the Chaldeans in the 
London Opposition Conference (Chaldean Patriachate of Babylon 2014).  
The raging war between Kanna and Afraim seeped into their followers in no time. 
Chaldeans on the side of Afraim questioned the legitimacy of Kanna’s leadership as they accused 
him of “boarding the American tank.” (Tomi 2012).  They also accused him of nepotism and of 
using the Chaldo-Assyrian title as a trick to “win over some nationalist Chaldeans.” (Sargon 
2004) On the other hand, proponents of Kanna so no harm in replying to these accusations with 
equally damning charges of sectarianism, falsifying history, and having a questionable loyalty. 
“We don’t know,” wondered one Kanna supporter addressing a supporter of Afraim, “are you 
with the Chaldeans or the Assyrians…?” before concluding that they were neither. This 
supporter was not implying that Afraim and his supporters are not Christians, but that they are 
working against the interests of Christians in general by “spreading dissent” among their co-
religionists (Sargon 2004).  
A third group of Christians which believed that all Christians were naturally Assyrians 
also existed but proved less consequential than the other two groups.  Headed by Ishaya Ishu, the 
Assyrian coalition formed under the name the General Assyrian Conference (GAC). GAC 
considered the naming issue to be of paramount importance for Iraq’s Christians and exhibited 
zealous views regarding the Assyrian land in Iraq. (Media 2017). Its approach to the naming 
issue differed significantly from the previous views we have encountered. While Kanna’s side 
called for Chaldo-Assyrianism and the Chaldeans wanted to keep the Chaldeans, Assyrians, 
Syriacs ethnically separate, GAC insisted with fervor on the Assyrian origin of Iraq’s Christians. 
As Ishu put it, “the constitutional division between Chaldeans and Assyrians is criminal for our 
people. This is a sacred matter for us and we will do our best to reunite the Assyrian people” 
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(ankawa.com 2005).33 GAC kept a low key overall and did not seem interested in the verbal 
fights which took place on ankawa.com.   
The verbal fights between the two main sides of the debate proliferated. At times they 
fought over who had a larger turn out of followers at a party event. At other times they repeated 
the same old fights over whose ethnicity was true and whose was made up. Despite their fierce 
nature, these fights and heated debate did not affect the reality of Iraq’s Christians much. As 
Emanuel Yukhana argues in his book, Our Civil War: The Naming War, the verbal war between 
the two became meaningless after the constitution was redrafted to include their names 
separately. This fact represented the legal divorce of the two ethnicities. As he put it, “our civil 
war was won by the extremist Assyrian action and extremist Chaldean reaction.” Yukhana 
rightly points out that the warring Assyrians and Chaldeans neither took into consideration other 
Iraqi Christians such as the Syriac, nor did they account for the effects of their disagreements on 
Christians in neighboring countries. (Yukhana 2005).  
As discussed in the first chapter, some Chaldeans pushed for a change in the constitution 
to name the different ethnic Christian sects separately. The Chaldeans also wanted their name to 
come third in order after the Arabs and the Kurds. Not all Chaldeans were in favor of such a 
change, except their voices were not loud enough. When a group claimed representing Chaldeans 
in Sweden expressed its support for the change, some Chaldeans immediately pushed back 
questioning the legitimacy of such a representation. (The Committee of United Chaldean Forces 
2005). On the other hand, some Assyrian groups expressed their disappointment at the change. 
One Assyrian organization claimed that the change constituted a “breach on the rights and 
                                                          
33 List 800 included among other Assyrian groups the Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress. Whether that is 
due to the fact that Yazidis use Syriac in their sacred texts, and therefore could be considered ethnically Assyrians, is 
left unexplained.  
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reality” of the Christians in general (Democratic Assyrian Organization 2005). The change in the 
draft of the constitution might have settled the legal debate, but the verbal fighting lingered on.   
The continuous verbal fighting proved useful for both ZOWAA and the Chaldean parties 
in the parliamentary elections which took place in December 2005.34 Having by that point 
established a fellowship, these parties had learnt from the National Assembly elections back in 
January that they needed to grow even bigger if they wanted to make it to the parliament. Having 
ran in the January elections in multiple independent parties and failed, the Christians, like the 
Mandaeans, realized that they needed to take part in larger coalitions in all future elections. The 
available material on the elections of January in ankawa.com indicates that such a realization 
drew the framework according to which both ZOWAA and the Chaldean Parties approached the 
elections in December. As Fuad Budagh, a representative of the Chaldean coalition in Baghdad 
put it, “We will not repeat the same mistake of the last elections and enter [the election] in a 
large number of parties and scatter our people” (Yusef 2005). Having learnt the lesson well, it 
was time to form coalitions. 
Both ZOWAA and the Chaldean parties became the nuclei of much bigger Christian 
coalitions.35 The polarization over the issue of naming convention proved enough to ensure each 
side a decent following. Interestingly, Chaldean, Assyrian, and Syriac Christian groups joined 
                                                          
34 Unfortunately, ankawa.com is missing a several months’ worth of archival content from the end of December 
2004 till mid-year 2005.  
35It is worth noting that I use the term Chaldean parties to refer to the fact that these parties were not represented by 
the CDU. The CDU, headed by Afraim, was based in Kurdistan and remained regionally bound, most likely to 
secure the Chaldean vote in the region. The CDU did not enter a coalition with other Chaldeans in Baghdad despite 
the similarity of their positions on the issue naming. The Chaldeans in main land Iraq, along with other like-minded 





each side, a fact that reflects the by now cross-ethnic nature of the ideological difference. 
ZOWAA and the Chaldo-Assyrian Syriac National Council came together to form List 740 
under the formal name al-Rafidain (the Two Rivers). Kanna was the head of the new coalition 
which included 78 Christian figures including a number of academics and represented all Iraqi 
provinces (Geljana 2005). List 740 earned a single seat in Baghdad. (Kireev 2007). However, they 
quickly complained of being victims of elections fraud. (Kit 2006). 
The Chaldean Ethnic Council along with the Assyrian National Party, the Independent 
Syriac Movement, and others formed list 752 al-Nahrain Watani (the Two Rivers [are] My 
Home). Heading list 752’s Baghdad office was Fouad Budagh. Despite all he said and did for the 
Chaldean cause, Afraim opted not to join list 752, which would have been the natural ideological 
choice for him. Rather, he chose to join the Kurdistan Alliance, a move which secured him a 
parliamentary seat in the elections. (Kurdistan Government 2005). List 752 failed to gain a seat, 
a fact which suggests that Afraim, an experienced politician by that point, must have known that 
his chances in the elections were better running alongside the Kurdistan Alliance than his co-
ideologists. GAC formed list 800 and entered the elections but did not gain any seats either.36 
The non-Muslim minorities, it is important to point out, were only reacting to the way the 
elections played out which, as Osman points out, “only acted to fuel sectarianism.” The 
elections, which Osman reminds us, were seen by the Shi’is as a “golden opportunity to rectify 
the political power disparity between them and the Sunnis.” (Osman 2002, p.212) As a result, 
they organized themselves in large coalitions, or lists which guaranteed political dominance. 
                                                          
36 For a detailed breakdown of the 2005 Legislative Elections results, refer to the electoral archive on 





Knowing that they will never rule Iraq in a such a political system, some Sunnis called for 
boycotting the elections altogether.  
Like the Mandaeans in the previous elections, the Christians viewed the elections as a 
chance to exercise politics on sectarian grounds. Affected by what Ismail et al calls a “climate of 
politicized sectarianism,” the different Christian parties and figures, like other Iraqi sects, took an 
approach that was “organized around sectarian political blocs.” (Ismael and Ismael 2015). The 
key difference between the two was what they thought of as being their sect. Some Christians 
viewed their sect being one inclusive category called the Chaldo-Assyrians. Those who believed 
this ethnic view represented them voted for list 740. Others who believed the Christians to be 
separate sects voted for list 752 and for Afraim as part of the Kurdistan Alliance. A third, smaller 
group believed all Christians to be Assyrians and voted for list 800 but won nothing. What 
remained absent from this scene were the Christian voices that called for a non-sectarian 
approach to the elections.  
Iraq’s Christians found themselves turning increasingly inwards after the U.S. led 
invasion. They sought mythologies about their history which backed their historical narratives as 
in the use of a Christian calendar to assert their ancient origins. Within the Christians, some 
sought to reconsider their history of interaction with the Muslims as one of continuous 
oppression. In doing so, they adopted, as did the Mandaeans, a narrative of victimhood. 
Understandably, the rhetoric of victimhood emanated after the increasing violence which the 
Christians were facing in Iraq. Yet, despite all they had in common, Iraq’s Christians remained 
very divided ethnically. The attempts to bridge the divide lacked support from the Chaldean and 
Assyrian political and religious leadership, and therefore remained small and based outside Iraq. 
The Chaldean – Assyrian divide over the naming convention dictated the political affiliations of 
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the Christians. This was clearest in the way they organized themselves before the 2005 
parliamentary elections as well as in how they voted in the elections. The Christians entered 
coalitions with other Christians from different ethnicities whose ethnic views aligned with theirs. 
The only exception was Afraim who joined a Kurdistan-based party, but only to secure the vote 
of the Chaldean constituency in the region.  
By defining their political outlook along sectarian lines, the Christians did not deviate 
from the Mandaeans or other sects in Iraq who organized themselves around “sectarian political 
blocs” as Ismael et al rightly put it. The Christian case was particularly complex due to the 
multiplicity of the competing ethnic claims they made about themselves. Luckily, their 
differences, sharp and angry as they were, remained contained within the sphere of discourse and 






This paper started out with the following question: How did the U.S. led invasion affect 
the discourse of two of Iraq’s non-Muslim minorities, the Mandaeans and the Christians. The 
short answer to that question is that it made their discourse more sectarian. Short answers are 
problematic however when applied to questions like this. As Fanar Haddad reminds us, [w]hen 
considering sectarian identity we are dealing with perceptions and emotions rather than 
attempting a grand narrative of sectarian relations with clearly defined categories and borders, 
we should begin by recognizing the inherent ambiguity of identity.” (Haddad 2011, p.3) With 
this in mind, this research looked at examples of the discourse of Mandaeans and Christians 
between the years 2002 and 2006 to identify changes in their conceptions of themselves and how 
they expressed themselves afterwards.  
The first chapter looked at how the Mandaeans and the Christians conceived of their 
group image around the time of the invasion. Both groups were debating basic notions of group 
identity. The Mandaeans on the Yahoo Group were debating whether they were a community or 
a religion. The Christians debated whether they were one people or multiple ethnic groups. These 
unsettled categories, along with the lack of clear leadership, led to disputes that questioned the 
existing narratives of history and identity. The 2003 invasion exacerbated this tenuous reality. 
The Mandaean organizational body suffered cracks that could have seen it divide in half as the 
Sabian Mandaean World Council emerged seemingly out of the blue, claiming to do a job 
already performed by the Mandaean Associations Union. The Mandaeans showed remarkable 
resilience to engaging in politics on sectarian basis before the invasion. They refused to take part 
in the London Conference of Iraqi opposition as a sect, but they did not stop Mandaean 
individuals from participating in it as members of other parties. In the case of the Christians, real 
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divisions along ethnic lines surfaced soon after the invasion. A number of Chaldeans rebelled on 
what they considered an Assyrian attempt to contain their ethnicity and suppress their identity. 
They formed their own parties and started heated disputes over issues of legitimacy and 
representation. Christian minorities like the Syriacs and the Armenians remained more or less 
silent and marginalized. 
The second chapter continues form the first. It looks at how the discourse of the 
Mandaeans and Christians continued to change. The worsening security situation and the rapid 
sectarian-ization of the political sphere saw the non-Muslim minorities turn more and more 
inwards. They propagated myths about their origins which bolstered their sense of group 
identity. They also adopted narratives of victimhood which helped them view their shared history 
with Muslims as one of uninterrupted religious oppression. These myths strengthened their 
sectarian identities, a fact that became very visible in the 2005 National Assembly elections and 
the Parliamentary elections. The Mandaeans, by and large, voted for a political coalition that 
contained a Mandaean candidate. Most Mandaeans chose that coalition because it had a 
Mandaean candidate in it, while some of them chose the coalition because it was what they 
considered a secular coalition. Their sectarian tendency made some question what happened to 
their old secular views. How they became confined to a sectarian choice is the story of the 2005 
elections. 
The Christians participated in both elections in multiple coalitions that differed on the 
issue of the ethnicity of Iraq’s Christians. Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Syriacs disagreed on 
whether they were one ethnicity or multiple ones and they polarized in political parties that 
reflected these conflicting, and competing, views. While this multiplicity of Christian parties 
drew severe criticism from many non-partisan Christians, the criticism revolved around the 
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argument that such divisions scattered the Christian vote. In the Parliamentary elections at the 
end of 2005, three distinct ethnic Christian views dominated the scene. The first view which 
believed all Christians to be one ethnicity, which they called Chaldo-Assyrian. This view was 
championed by ZOWAA which was headed by the Assyrian Kanna, who was also a member of 
the Governing Council appointed by the U.S. led Coalition. This view was prevalent enough to 
win a seat. The opposition to this view claimed that Chaldo-Assyrian was a made-up ethnicity. 
They argued that Chaldeans, Assyrian, and Syriacs were separate ethnicities and they managed 
to change the constitution to state that. This view was led by multiple Chaldean parties in 
addition to some Assyrians and Syriacs who agreed with that. This view won the parties that 
supported failed to win a seat in Baghdad but won one seat in Kurdistan in the parliamentary 
elections. A third, less known view claimed that all Christians were Assyrians in origin. This 
view remained marginal and failed to gain any parliamentary seats.  
To a large extent, sectarian tendencies dictated the minority vote in the 2005 elections. 
This fact reflects a deeper truth which was that the U.S. led invasion created a political 
atmosphere in which sectarian identities developed at a rapid pace. Many people who used to 
lean left politically or who identified as secular found themselves cheering for candidates who 
either shared their ethnicity or, in the case of some Christians, who agreed with their conception 
of ethnicity. To their credit, the minorities remained peaceful throughout this period, always 
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